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ABSTRACT 
Democratization in post-conflict situations is a major challenge, now and in the 
foreseeable future. Yet, the puzzle of why some of these attempts fail and others succeed 
is still unresolved. This thesis argues that post-conflict democratization by third parties, at 
its core, is a norm diffusion process. Successful democratization depends foremost on the 
acceptance and internalization of democratic norms by the target society.  Knowledge of 
the norm diffusion concept, especially the influence of the two variables, cultural match 
and norm empowerment on the process might lead to the development and the application 
of better democratization strategies. This thesis argues that post-conflict situations with 
their specific features–primarily characterized by value disorientation–offer a unique 
opportunity for a democratic transition. It examines the cases of the Weimar Republic, 
the Federal Republic of Germany, and Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia) in order to 
demonstrate the explanatory power of the norm diffusion theory, specifically its added 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
This thesis analyzes how international actors diffuse norms in post-conflict peace 
building. It intends to help shape a new approach and better working strategies for 
democratization in post-conflict situations, which have been a major challenge since the 
Cold War ended. Yet, this is not a new task since post-conflict peace building and 
democratization were major challenges already after the two world wars. The mixed 
results in most past and ongoing missions demonstrate that, so far, a formula of how 
successful democratization can be achieved in post-conflict situations has not been found. 
Although post-conflict peace building and democratization are a prominent and often 
discussed topic among decision-makers and social scientists, the puzzle has not been 
solved yet. 
This thesis examines the cases of the Weimar Republic, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, and Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia) through the conceptual lens of the norm 
diffusion concept with the aim to demonstrate the explanatory power of that theory, 
specifically its added value in studying the success and failure of past and present 
democratization in post conflict situations in the hope that better understanding might 
lead to better policies. 
This thesis argues that post-conflict situations with their specific features–
primarily characterized by value disorientation–offer a unique opportunity for a 
democratic transition. Democratization needs to be regarded as a social learning process, 
and successful democratization depends foremost on the acceptance and internalization of 
democratic norms by the target society.  
Looking at democratization attempts through the lens of norm diffusion provides 
valuable insights and understanding of the conditions within this process. The focus of 
the study is on the enabling and obstructing factors (enablers and obstacles) of this 
transition. Since the internalization of democratic norms is, above all, a mental 
transformation process, both cognitive and affective, knowledge about the enablers and 
obstacles within the process serves different purposes. First, it can help to explain the 
puzzle of why democratization attempts under apparently similar conditions lead to 
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different outcomes. Second, the norm diffusion concept can be a tool to analyze target 
societies and their starting position and thereby protect against misleading assumptions 
and overoptimistic expectations in ongoing and future democratization attempts. 
Furthermore, the findings provided by this research are paramount for the development of 
adequate policies. 
So far, norm diffusion has been researched mainly in the context of the 
enlargement processes of the Euro-Atlantic institutions, particularly the European Union 
(EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The end of the Cold War and 
the thaw in East-West relations—climaxing in the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact—
allowed the Euro-Atlantic Community to gradually spread its norms further east and to 
construct a united Europe “based on Western values” on the entire continent.1 
The promotion of peaceful transitions to liberal democracy and free market 
economies in the immediate neighborhood still is a declared policy goal of the Euro-
Atlantic Community. The successful integration of many Central and Eastern European 
states into NATO and the EU is a significant achievement in the process of enlarging the 
zone of peace and democracy in Europe.2 
However, in spite of these favorable developments and a growing Euro-Atlantic 
Community, the expected “peace dividend” of a reduced military could only be partly 
collected due to new challenges in the security environment.3 With the breakup of the 
former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, the resurgence of radical nationalism threatened 
Europe for the third time in the twentieth century.4 The direst consequence was three and  
 
                                                 
1 Ian Q. R. Thomas, The Promise of Alliance: NATO and the Political Imagination (Lanham: Rowman 
& Littlefield, 1997), 144-145. 
2 Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, The Real World Order: Zones of Peace/Zones of Turmoil 
(Chatham, New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers, 1996), 35. 
3 Stanley R. Sloan, NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic 
Bargain Reconsidered (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003), 49. 
4 Lars-Erik Cederman, “Nationalism and Ethnicity,” in Handbook of International Relations, edited by 
Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (London et al.: SAGE, 2002) 409; Michael E. 
Brown, “The Causes of Internal Conflict: An Overview,” in Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict, edited by, 
Michael E. Brown et al. (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1997), 3-25; Stephen Van Evera, “Hypotheses 
on Nationalism and War,” in Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict, edited by, Michael E. Brown et al. 
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1997), 40-41.   
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a half years of ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina resulting in around 200,000 dead and two million refugees who largely 
headed to Western Europe.5 
Bosnia can be seen as a prime example of the kind of intra-state conflict that has 
increasingly challenged the Euro-Atlantic Community since the end of the Cold War. 
Internal conflict has become dominant worldwide, and the demand for peace operations 
has grown significantly. The number of United Nations (UN) mandated peace operations 
increased almost fourfold during the last fifteen years. Not only the number, but also the 
nature and the context of these operations have changed. The main reasons for 
intervention were no longer inter-state conflicts but intra-state and ethnic conflicts, such 
as in Rwanda, in Somalia, and in the former Yugoslavia. Whereas most of the peace 
operations at first took place in Africa, with relatively small military contributions from 
developed countries, the wars in the Balkans changed that situation and led to a stronger 
direct involvement of European states in peace operations.6 
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, both processes are still ongoing. The 
Euro-Atlantic Community is growing and spreading its norms and values peacefully, and 
at the same time increasingly participating in peace building and democratization 
processes. Whereas the enlargement processes in NATO and EU can be regarded as 
success stories, post-conflict peace building and democratization processes are, at best, 
partially successful. This is disappointing as well as surprising since there should be 
enough experience in this field to achieve better results. In spite of the many attempts to 
democratize countries in the context of post-conflict peace building, the overall results so 
far are not convincing. Failed approaches have been repeated and many projects still 
seem to be characterized more by a trial and error approach than by a sound long-term 
strategy. Strategy and operational design of post-conflict peace building repeatedly 
focused too heavily on exit strategies and on the conditions that needed to be created for a 
                                                 
5 James Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War (London: 
Hurst and Company, 1997); Lars-Erik Cederman, “Nationalism and Ethnicity,” in Handbook of 
International Relations, ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (London et al.: SAGE, 
2002) 409; Mark Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century (New York: Vintage, 1998), 346, 
391-393.  
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successful transition to stable peace and democracy and less on how these conditions 
could be created in the democratization process. 
Post-conflict peace building began long before UN Secretary General Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali in his “Agenda for Peace” coded the term in 1992. The first 
democratization projects in post-conflict situations took place in the context of the 
reconstruction of Europe after the First World War and again after the Second World 
War. Today, there exists a broadly shared concept among the various agents in the field 
of post-conflict peace building of how countries should be transformed. The aim of post-
conflict peace building is to create a stable peace through the democratization of the 
respective target country. The most prominent post-conflict democratization attempts 
today are the ongoing projects in Afghanistan, in Bosnia, in Kosovo and in Iraq. 
This thesis argues that post-conflict democratization by third parties, at its core, is 
a norm diffusion process. It also attempts to explain this process in order to assist in the 
resolution of ongoing problems with establishing democracy in post-conflict situations. 
Successful democratization takes place only if democratic norms are accepted and 
internalized by the target society. This thesis will show that in post-conflict situations the 
application of insights from norm diffusion research might turn failure into success in 
democratization attempts. 
Democratization in post-conflict situations is a major challenge, now and in the 
foreseeable future. The puzzle of why some of these attempts fail and others succeed is 
still unresolved. The formula, if there is one, for this task is yet to be found. It therefore 
remains a prime research topic. And there is a high demand for research that approaches 
the topic from new perspectives. 
The existing studies concentrate either on the practical aspects in the planning and 
conduct of post-conflict peace building operations or on democratic transition processes. 
But so far, both topics have been researched separately from each other. Also, many 
studies, in both fields, have a descriptive and explanatory character without much 
reference to or incorporation of International Relations (IR) theory. According to Roland 
                                                                                                                                                 
6 United Nations, Peacekeeping: Meeting New Challenges., 1. 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/faq/q&a.pdf, (accessed, December 1, 2006).  
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Paris, there is a vast literature “on practical, policy-related issues such as the design and 
conduct of particular missions, rather than building bridges between the study of peace 
operations and larger theoretical debates in the [political science] discipline.”7  
Furthermore, the question of what the end-state should look like in post-conflict 
situations concerning the transition to democracy seems to be well researched; however, 
the question of how to get there has been mostly neglected. Studies give attention to the 
desirable outcomes and compare this ideal with the situation in a specific country at a 
specific time. Only few studies track post conflict peace building endeavors over a period 
of time; and, there exists no study that analyzes the democratization process in the post 
conflict situation through the conceptual lens of norm diffusion. By doing so, the present 
study follows a suggestion of Roland Paris.8 
It closes a gap in the existing scholarly literature and contributes to more closely 
connecting IR theory and the conflict resolution field. It sheds light on post-conflict peace 
building and democratization from a new perspective and it helps to explain why many 
post-conflict peace building projects succeed or fail. This thesis shows how IR theory can 
contribute significantly to the study of democratization in post-conflict situations: “The 
core preoccupations of IR theory—such as the role of interests, ideas, and norms in 
international politics, the possibility of cooperation among international actors, and the 
interaction between domestic and international politics – are questions that peace 
operations also raise.”9 The insights from the norm diffusion concept have considerable 
relevance for the development of strategies aimed to turn “zones of turmoil and 
development” into “zones of peace and democracy.”10 Knowledge of the norm diffusion 
concept is key to winning the “hearts and minds” of the people in war-torn societies, as 
we know from democratic peace theory that democracy and peace are closely connected.  
  
                                                 
7 Roland Paris, “Broadening the Study of Peace Operations,” International Studies Review. 2 3(2000): 
36; See also: Roland Paris, “Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism,” International 
Security. 22 2 (1997): 63. 
8 Paris, “Broadening the Study of Peace Operations,” 44.  
9 Paris, “Broadening the Study of Peace Operations,” 36. See also: Paris, “Peacebuilding and the 
Limits of Liberal Internationalism,” 31-32. 
10 Singer and Wildavsky, 7. 
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The main research question of this thesis is: How much does the process of norm 
diffusion affect success and failure of democratization through third parties in post-
conflict situations? 
Sub-questions to be addressed by the study include 
1. What are the chief characteristics of post-conflict situations? 
2. Who are the main actors in post-conflict peace building and democratization 
processes? 
3. Which norms are transferred, and, most importantly, how are norms 
transferred? 
4.  What are the major enabling and obstructing factors (enablers and obstacles) 
in the norm diffusion process? 
5. Can these factors be influenced, and if so, how? 
 
Two hypotheses will guide the research. The first is that a post-conflict situation 
offers a unique opportunity for the diffusion of democratic norms. The second is that 
knowledge and understanding of the main enabling and obstructing factors in the norm 
diffusion process can help to analyze more adequately the post-conflict starting position 
in a target society, which is an important precondition for the development and 
implementation of adequate democratization strategies. 
The main argument of this thesis is that successful democratization can only take 
place if democratic norms are accepted and internalized by the target society. Although 
the post-conflict situation offers a unique opportunity for norm diffusion, this chance is 
often not used because of a lack of understanding of the process of norm diffusion. The 
key actors in post-conflict peace building basically share the same normative setup. They 
dispose of strong, yet over time diminishing leverage, but they can only use this 
advantage when they apply the rules of norm diffusion in their strategies and empower 
new norms adequately. 
Although cases differ, the findings of this thesis are transferable. They should 
help us to analyze the starting position of a target society, to develop an appropriate 
strategy of norm empowerment, to identify and surmount obstacles and to use enablers.  
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The thesis consists of four chapters. This chapter has given information on the 
topicality and the relevance of the topic, on the major research questions and arguments 
as well as on the organization of the thesis. The second chapter describes the theoretical 
framework for the research. The primary focus of chapter two is on how democratic 
norms are transferred in post conflict peace building projects. The question of what is 
transferred does not play a major role in understanding the process of norm diffusion in 
post-conflict situations, but both questions are not divisible since what is transferred 
influences the willingness to accept new norms. The third chapter contains the three case 
studies. In each case study, the different enablers and obstacles in the democratic 
transition process are analyzed in the specific situational context. At the end of chapter 
three the findings of the case studies are compared. Chapter IV draws conclusions. 
To answer the research question and to illustrate the value of this approach, this 
thesis transfers key insights of the concept of norm diffusion to post-conflict peace 
building. To support the argument that successful democratization can only take place if 
democratic norms are accepted and internalized by the target society and to test the 
hypotheses, this thesis will first conceptualize post-conflict peace building and norm 
diffusion separately, and then link both. Afterwards, the conceptual framework is tested 
in three case studies: the Weimar Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Of the several available cases concerning that issue, these three cases were 
selected for a comparative structured, focused case study11 because they offer a good 
opportunity to demonstrate the influence of the two independent variables, cultural match 
and norm empowerment on the dependent variable democratization in post conflict 
environments. Also, together, these three cases reflect a broad spectrum of starting 
positions the international community can encounter in further post-conflict 
democratization attempts.  
The cases show common patterns as well as significant diversities. All three 
countries in the post-conflict phase were perceived as posing a threat to European 
                                                 
11 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennet, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University, 2005), 67-72. 
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security. However, the serious commitment to democratize each respective country and 
the norm empowerment by the international community differed. 
The Weimar Republic surpassed the worst expectations of the pessimists at that 
time; democracy was only short-lived and developed into an authoritarian state. The 
Weimar Republic is often referred to as a prime example for what can go wrong in post-
conflict situations and as a failed democracy, whereas the Federal Republic of Germany 
is often used as a model case for a successful democratization and integration into the 
European Community after the Second World War. Both cases demonstrate how the 
same society experienced significant change in its political culture within a few decades. 
The Federal Republic of Germany has long been regarded as an established, mature 
democracy and also today, after unification, there is no doubt that democracy is deeply 
entrenched in German society. Bosnia and Herzegovina, with its inherent danger of 
threatening Europe with the spread or reemergence of civil war, “posed a potential threat 
to European security.”12 The case of Bosnia demonstrates how the norm diffusion 
concept works in the context of a divided society. The information garnered from the 
research can be applied after both inter-state and intra-state conflict. 
Measurement is a problem of most social sciences since mental and affective 
processes cannot be observed directly. Yet these processes can be observed indirectly via 
various indicators that are subject to interpretation, such as political behavior and 
decision-making. Electoral processes and election results can be evaluated as well as 
political rhetoric. There are different ways to collect, analyze and compare sociological 
data, such as opinion polls, surveys or interviews. It can be observed whether “hate 
speech” and attempts to radicalize masses are part of a political campaign or whether 
reconciliatory and more modest tunes prevail in these campaigns. Also, there are different 
ways to compare an existing political culture or a process of convergence and divergence 
between different political cultures. It is possible, within limits, to grasp political reality 
and to assess how far democratic norms are and are not established in daily political life. 
Indicators can be observed both for elites and in the population. Scholars can judge 
whether people act in accordance with an international norm or whether people deviate 
                                                 
12 Paris, “Broadening the Study of Peace Operations,” 37. 
 9
from it. The more people act in accordance with a democratic norm, the more it can be 
regarded as successfully diffused. Changes in behavioral patterns, especially a deviation 
from former patterns in the direction of desired behavior, can be grasped and assessed 
relatively objectively. Changes in the cultural match scale can also help to determine in 
which direction a society is moving in its belief systems, norms and values.13 Based on 
these assumptions, this thesis will use the estimation of success or failure of the 
democratization process in the referred to sources as a benchmark for measurement. 
Both primary and secondary sources will be used for the theoretical framework 
and for the case studies. Main primary sources are official documents from the UN, the 
EU and the OSCE, as well as statistical data provided by Freedom House and the UN. 
Secondary sources will be derived from the various fields of research, which are merged 
in this thesis:  
• scholarly books and journal articles on post-conflict peace building  
• scholarly books and journal articles on norm diffusion, and 
• scholarly books and journal articles on peace building in the Weimar Republic, 
the Federal Republic of Germany, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
 
                                                 
13 J. Meyer and D. Strang, “Institutional Conditions for Diffusion,” Theory and Society. 22 (August 
1993): 503-504. 
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II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
A. PEACE OPERATIONS 
Especially since the end of the Cold War and the many new missions in its 
aftermath, the literature on peace operations has grown rapidly. A large part of that 
literature deals with the evolution of peacekeeping and the change in the concept.14 
According to its founding document, the purpose of the UN is “to maintain 
international peace and security.”15 To allow the world organization to fulfill its purpose, 
the UN Charter, especially Chapters VI and VII, provides the organization with different 
options for acting in inter-state conflicts. Chapter VI deals with peaceful conflict 
resolution “by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial 
settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their 
own choice.”16 Chapter VII authorizes the UN to use force when international peace and 
security are threatened.17 
Since the end of the Cold War, internal conflict has become dominant worldwide. 
Yet within the UN Charter there is no comparable catalogue of options to counter intra-
state conflict as there is for inter-state conflict. The UN Charter mainly highlights the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of states and the principle of non-intervention in 
                                                 
14 See for example John Hillen, The Blue Helmets: The Strategy of UN Military Operations 
(Washington D.C.: Brassey’s, 2000);  A good overview of evolution and change of peacekeeping is 
provided by Frederick H. Fleitz Jr., Peacekeeping Fiascoes of the 1990s: Causes, Solutions, and U.S. 
Interests (Westport, Conneticut, London: Praeger, 2002); See also Roland Paris, At War’s End: Building 
Peace After Civil Conflict (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
15 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, preamble, http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/ 
(accessed April 2, 2007) 
16 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, chapter VI, Article 33, 
http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/ (accessed April 2, 2007) 
17 “Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate 
or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to 
maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, 
and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.” United Nations, Charter 
of the United Nations, chapter VII, Article 42, http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/ (accessed April 2, 2007) 
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internal affairs. However, Article 39 allows the Security Council to interpret acts of 
domestic violence as an affair of international interest.18 
The means to contain different kinds of conflicts were peacekeeping missions. 
Peacekeeping missions are not addressed in the UN Charter. The concept of 
peacekeeping was developed by the second UN Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjöld. 
Traditional peacekeeping missions were observer missions designed to contain inter-state 
conflict. Observer missions consisted of unarmed observers or lightly armed military 
personnel (“blue helmets”) with tasks such as the observation of ceasefires or the 
separation of forces. These peacekeepers were considered as a neutral third party that 
would act impartially and use force only in self-defense. According to that concept, 
peacekeepers were only deployed after a ceasefire and with the prior consent of all parties 
to the conflict. The aim of this kind of operation was to prevent renewed fighting by 
separating the parties and to give “time and breathing space for diplomatic efforts to 
address the underlying causes of [the] conflict.”19 The latter goal was often not reached 
since observer missions, in fact, could only keep a fragile peace but could not contribute 
to the solution of the root causes of the conflict. Open-ended missions such as those in 
Cyprus or Lebanon were the consequence. 
With the end of the Cold War, the Security Council established new, and more 
complex, what Ghali called multifunctional peace building operations with stronger non-
military components for economic reconstruction, refugee return, institution building, etc. 
The goal was much more ambitious: it was to play a more active role in bringing about 
lasting, sustainable peace.20 The Security Council now authorized peace operations based 
on the former peacekeeping principles, also for intra-state conflict, without a ceasefire or 
the consent of the warring parties, such as found in Rwanda, Somalia and Bosnia. The 
                                                 
18 “The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, 
or act of aggression….”United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, chapter VII, Article 39, 
http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/ (accessed April 2, 2007) 
19 United Nations, Peacekeeping: Meeting New Challenges, 4.  
20 Hillen, 139; Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “An Agenda for Peace. Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking 
and peacekeeping: Report of the Secretary-General,” June 17, 1992.” 
http://www.un.org/docs/SG/agpeace.html, (accessed April 2, 2007); Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “Supplement 
to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General,” 3 January 1995. 
http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agsupp.html, (accessed March 19, 2007). 
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gap between the mandates and the reality on the ground resulted in the failure of all three 
missions and much discussion about “mission creep.” These failures, in turn, led to a 
fundamental reform of the peacekeeping concept. The main questions were how the 
challenges of intra-state conflicts could be met: how and when to intervene to avert gross 
violations of human rights, leading inter alia to streams of refugees,  and ethnic cleansing, 
and potential horizontal escalation (spill-over) in the regional neighborhood.21 
Intra-state conflicts, which often have an ethnic dimension, require another 
quality of operations. It is no longer sufficient, and in most cases not even possible, to 
separate warring parties along agreed zones of separation, since in an intra-state conflict, 
usually there are no clear dividing lines.22 Instead, there often is a patchwork of state and 
non-state actors in the conflict (often of different ethnicities, religions or cultures) spread 
all over the country—with changing majorities from one area to another. The main 
characteristics of this type of conflict are the fragmentation of the warring parties and 
massive violations of international law, expressed foremost in indescribable atrocities 
towards and among the civilian population. The major lessons of these conflicts in the 
1990s were that to contribute efficiently to sustainable peace in intra-state conflicts 
required a broad spectrum of military and non-military means in order to re-establish 
political and economic stability and for addressing the roots of the conflict.23 
To date, there are no generally shared definitions of the various types of peace 
operations. However, the UN presently distinguishes three major types of peace 
operations, depending on the state of conflict, the purposes, and the mission goal: 
peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace building. However, even these terms are not 
defined clearly, since peacekeeping and peace building are defined in similar, partly 
overlapping descriptions and peacemaking is not clearly separated from peace 
enforcement. Peace building takes place in the post-conflict phase, which means after 
war-fighting has stopped and a settlement has taken place. It aims at establishing “the 
foundations of peace” in a broad mission spectrum: “reintegrating former combatants into 
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22 Ibid., 1.  
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civilian society, providing technical assistance for democratic development and 
promoting conflict resolution and reconciliation techniques.”24 Thomas M. Franck calls 
these multifunctional missions “full-service operations.”25 Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his 
“Agenda for Peace” also stresses the importance of a comprehensive approach:   
When conflict breaks out, mutually reinforcing efforts at peacemaking and 
peace-keeping come into play. Once these have achieved their objectives, 
only sustained, cooperative work to deal with underlying economic, social, 
cultural and humanitarian problems can place an achieved peace on a 
durable foundation. Preventive diplomacy is to avoid a crisis; post-conflict 
peace-building is to prevent a recurrence.… 
There is a new requirement for technical assistance which the United 
Nations has an obligation to develop and provide when requested: support 
for the transformation of deficient national structures and capabilities, 
and for the strengthening of new democratic institutions. The authority of 
the United Nations system to act in this field would rest on the consensus 
that social peace is as important as strategic or political peace. There is 
an obvious connection between democratic practices— such as the rule of 
law and transparency in decision-making—and the achievement of true 
peace and security in any new and stable political order.26 
 
No matter how detailed the definition, basically, the aim of post-conflict peace 
building is to create conditions for a stable peace.27 Ironically, after the war is before a 
war in many instances. As long as the underlying causes of a conflict are not solved, new 
violence may arise. In practice, once and again, new violence emerges after long lasting 
peace operations have taken place because the root causes of a conflict were not removed 
or even addressed. Peace remains fragile and breaks down once it is seriously challenged 
again.28 A first and important aim is to stabilize fragile post-conflict situations as early as 
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possible and to prevent new eruptions of violence. Afterwards, other activities gain 
importance. Various actors contribute to the aim of a stable peace with a broad range of 
activities ranging from demobilization and reconstructing the economy to temporary third 
party governance of an entire country (protectorates).  The most important question once 
the fighting stops is how to maintain the peace on a long-term basis. The desired end-
state of post-conflict peace building operations thus is “to create conditions that will 
allow peace to endure long after the departure of the peace builders.”29 
This is a difficult and complex task as the stabilization process takes place in an 
unstable environment where many challenges have to be dealt with concomitantly right 
from the beginning. These challenges comprise international as well as domestic factors. 
Both have to be taken into consideration at the earliest stages of the planning for peace 
operations. But planning depends on a definition of goals. Stable peace is too abstract a 
guideline. Conditions of stable peace have to be determined. Many scholars have 
analyzed and evaluated specific operations towards that aim.30 
The term “conditions” for stable peace, instead of “building bricks for” or “path 
to” stable peace seems to be the most appropriate, because, in the literature, there is 
neither a shared set of conditions nor an agreed sequencing. Apart from the shared view 
that a relatively stable security environment is a prerequisite for progress in other areas 
like reconstruction, opinions differ about which steps to prioritize and how to sequence 
them. In other words: We know what the house is supposed to look like and we know that 
security is the foundation, but we have different construction plans for the rest of the 
house. Therefore, the following discussion of conditions leading to stable peace after 
conflict can only be a first approximation of a complex topic.  
Post-conflict peace building is a multidimensional process that comprises both 
physical and social reconstruction. As post-conflict peace building operations take place 
after the official termination of violence, a conflict settlement between the former 
warring parties, often mediated by third parties, can be regarded as the first step towards 
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the aim of a stable peace.  In particular, the design of this settlement, such as a peace 
treaty, is a crucial condition for the promotion of peace.  One does not need to refer to the 
“Versailles Peace Treaty” to underline that revisionism can become a prime cause of 
renewed violence in the future. Ideally, a treaty that is seen by all sides as legitimate and 
kept in good faith is a key to successful peace building. When one of the parties is 
coerced into signing a formal peace treaty, this is a bad starting point for the development 
of the peace process in the long run. Unfortunately, war mostly ends with victory and 
defeat and a new power balance that obliges one party to accept what it did not aim for 
earlier. Promoting acceptability thus becomes a primary means of peace building. 
Once a post-conflict peace operation has started, the highest priority needs to be 
given to the establishment of a secure environment. A stable security situation has turned 
out to be a prerequisite for progress in every domain. Delays in deployment and the 
subsequent breakdown of internal order open up a breathing space for spoilers. Internal 
stabilization is often not possible without external help. Consequently, a number of 
scholars examine the role of the international community in post-conflict situations. 
Saadia Touval and I. William Zartman deal with the right timing for third party 
involvement. They stress that intervention and mediation efforts are more likely to 
succeed when the warring parties have reached the stage of a “mutually hurting 
stalemate,” defined as the time “when one side realizes that it is unable to achieve its 
aims, resolve the problem, or win the conflict by itself; the stalemate is completed when 
the other side reaches a similar conclusion.”31 The significance of timing is undisputed, 
but the definition of the “right moment” remains controversial.32 
Stephen John Stedman points out that the vision and the capacity of international 
interveners to keep the peace must be adapted to the implementation environment. 
Ideally, the vision is shared throughout the international community. Strategy and 
sequencing, combined with the appropriate provision of troops and resources—based on 
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a broad analysis of the specific post-conflict situation—determine the outcome.33  Fen 
Osler Hampson supports that argumentation. For Hampson, a strong commitment of the 
third party, he calls it “staying power,” coupled with sufficient resources and moderate 
expectations about what is achievable, is the key to success.34 A sufficient provision of 
strategy and resources is only granted when “great or regional powers” have an interest in 
stabilizing the conflict.35  Thus, the involvement and the contribution of the willing and 
capable are a desired condition for operations strong enough to promote the peace 
process. 
In addition, third party activities in post-conflict situations become more efficient 
and more effective if they are streamlined, or, at least, coordinated. But, as Roy Lickider 
observes, the international community is no “single actor, with common goals and 
strategies.”36 In large, multifunctional peace building operations a multitude of states and 
international governmental and non-governmental organizations is engaged, forming an 
action-set of close inter-institutional cooperation and rivalry. When international actors 
are either divided regarding the right strategy “or do not fully support an operation, 
would-be spoilers can take advantage of international splits to attack the peace 
process.”37 
It is particularly important — and often makes the difference between success and 
failure—during the demobilization phase that third parties deter “any party from taking 
advantage of their former adversary’s vulnerability.”38 Civil wars, especially, are unlikely 
to end unless third parties can protect the former belligerents in the post-conflict period.39 
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Once the violence has stopped, it is important that the former warring parties learn 
and pursue non-violent conflict resolution processes. Such processes often depend on 
effective and legitimate institutions. Crocker stresses the challenge to create “a stable, 
functioning government, society, and culture in which conflicts are settled through 
negotiation rather than through violence” in the aftermath of a conflict settlement.40 
Institution, state and nation building interact and build on one another. This includes the 
(re-)establishment of a functioning legal system. It needs to be so much trusted that 
citizens do not perceive a need to resort to self-help. And it has to contribute to address 
past wrongdoing in a way that promotes reconciliation between victims and perpetrators 
alike. Cohen argues that “justice and the rule of law are [the] cornerstones upon which a 
sustainable peace is built.”41 
Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw point out that “meeting the challenge of 
nation-building mean[s] more than creating political institutions. It also require[s] the 
development of a modern economy.”42 Nils Petter Gleditsch also stresses that economic 
development is an important factor towards peace, since “wealth is negatively associated 
with armed conflict” and can even be regarded “as a general deterrent” to participating in 
violent acts. Furthermore, there is a widely, yet not universally shared belief that “trade 
seems to promote peaceful relations”43 and that “moving from poverty to wealth is 
probably the most effective means of improving human security.”44 Where peace 
building does not lead to socio-economic recovery and third-party intervention does not 
lead to the improvement of living conditions, peace building efforts become  
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discredited, receptivity for hate speech and demagogy increases, and radicalization  
and renewed violence cannot be ruled out. 
However, institution-building is not enough for the creation of a stable peace, 
neither in the political or economic realm. The spread of peaceful ways for conflict 
resolution needs to be promoted top-down and bottom-up alike.  This includes a change 
of political culture, e.g. in terms of compromising or accepting electoral defeats and 
opposition rights, so that institution building creates more than “hollow facades.” The 
bottom-up approach, often done by NGOs, promotes the emergence of civil societies 
which support the peace process. They “help to sustain peace agreements by working at 
the grassroots level to legitimize peace and make it more than an elite concern.” Local 
organizations “can address key issues such as reconciliation, justice, and human rights” 
and thereby help to remove the root causes of a recently terminated conflict.45 
The observation of human rights and the protection of minorities are crucial to 
winning peace. Among the most important indicators of “positive peace” are “the 
promotion of human rights and the establishment of institutions capable of advocating 
and protecting human rights [which] are desirable for societies emerging from war.”46 
Increasingly, “international norms on democratic forms of government [are regarded] as a 
fundamental human right.”47 
All parties to the conflict, majorities and minorities alike, need to be included in 
these multidimensional reconstruction processes, and in the building of a more peaceful 
society. Local ownership and power-sharing are equally important factors in this regard.  
There is a need to put “local stakeholders—including those who have been the victims of 
war as well as those who have been the perpetrators of war—at the center of external 
support for rebuilding.”48 
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Furthermore, it is not enough to concentrate on purely physical or material 
reconstruction processes. Especially in internal conflicts, in divided societies where 
identity conflicts prevail, reconciliation and “social reconstruction” are even more 
important to winning the peace.49 
No matter what strategy for winning the peace is applied, building a sustainable, a 
stable peace is always a highly complex, costly and time-consuming project, with 
manifold risks of failure: “real peace takes time; building national capacities takes time; 
rebuilding takes time.”50 This runs counter to election cycles, legislative periods, media 
attention and the short-term ebb and flow of politics in democracies.  
The present study acknowledges the importance of these factors. However, this 
study argues that in the long-term perspective of a stable peace, a profound peaceful 
change of political culture is important and that such a societal transformation in post-
conflict situations, which addresses the root causes of conflicts in the sense of structural 
prevention, is possible within a norm diffusion process.  
B. NORM DIFFUSION 
The term norm is used in a variety of research fields, usually as a synonym for a 
specific standard. In the social sciences and in this thesis, norms are understood as social 
norms, defined as “shared [or collective] expectations about the [standard of] appropriate 
behavior held by a collectivity of actors” with a given identity.51 According to their 
function, three major categories exist: regulative, constitutive, and evaluative or 
prescriptive norms. Regulative norms “order and constrain behavior; constitutive 
norms...create new actors, interests, or categories of action; evaluative or prescriptive 
norms” imply what ought to be, a “shared moral assessment.” Norms involve standards 
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of appropriateness. Yet, what is appropriate or not depends on judgments within societal 
context. Conforming or deviating behaviors usually result in different reactions. “Norm-
breaking behavior...generates disapproval or stigma and norm conforming 
behavior...produces praise, or, in the case of a highly internalized norm, because it is so 
taken for granted,... no reaction whatsoever.”52 
A body of norms defines the identity of a particular society. “Norms thus either 
define (or constitute) identities or prescribe (or regulate) behavior, or they do both.”53 
Since societies continually develop, norms are subject to change. Behavior or choices that 
are considered as appropriate today may not have been considered as appropriate in the 
past, in the same society, or still may be considered as inappropriate in another society. 
Also, one can assume an ongoing struggle of norm competition both at the domestic and 
at the international level.54 Societies interact and through this interaction norms spread. A 
standard definition for that spread, norm diffusion, is the “transfer or transmission of 
objects, processes, ideas, and information from one population or region to another.”55  
Norm diffusion is of major research interest in IR theory, especially in 
constructivism.56 According to the constructivist view “reality is socially constructed by 
cognitive structures that give meaning to the material world.”57 Constructivists have 
researched how norms and social context influence social features of political life, such 
as political culture and identity. Research suggests that norms have a significant influence 
on actor identities, perceptions, decision-making and implementation.58 Norms produce 
social order and stability through “shared ideas, expectations, and beliefs about 
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appropriate behavior.” At the same time, norms contribute to a world in flux since “idea 
shifts and norm shifts are,” according to constructivists, “the main vehicles for system 
transformation.”59 International norms affect domestic norms and promote change of 
political culture and identity.60 
Norm diffusion, as a form of international socialization, has been studied in the 
context of the different “waves of democracy,” the worldwide transitions to democracy 
especially after the end of the Cold War,61 as well as in “the spread of liberal economic 
ideas and policies throughout the world.”62 The role of international norms and norm 
diffusion has also been studied in the context of the enlargement processes of 
International Organizations (IOs) such as NATO and the EU.63 
In general, norm diffusion can be regarded as a permanent process that takes place 
both actively and passively, intentionally and unintentionally, promoted by a variety of 
actors in the domestic and in the international arena. For the purpose of this study, the 
focus of interest lies in intentional diffusion. How successfully and how quickly norms 
can be diffused depends on different factors which either facilitate or hamper the process. 
Finnemore and Sikkink have researched how norms (like the right of 
humanitarian intervention, diplomatic immunity or the principle of self-determination) 
gain influence in international politics. They argue that the influence of international 
norms on domestic norms increases in parallel to a norm’s “life cycle.” In their model, a 
norm evolves in a three stage “life cycle,” which actually is less a cycle than a life course. 
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Each stage is dominated by “different actors, motives, and mechanisms of influence” and 
by a specific behavioral logic including “issues about the costs of norm-violation or 
benefits from norm adherence.” In theory, the process begins with the emergence of a 
new norm (norm emergence), a stage where norm entrepreneurs try “to convince a 
critical mass of states (norm leaders) to embrace new norms.”  The number of norm 
followers increases in the next stage of the process (norm cascade). The motivation to 
become a norm follower varies. Basically, one can assume “that a combination of 
pressure for conformity, the desire to enhance international legitimization, and the desire 
of state leaders to enhance their self-esteem facilitate norm cascades.” When about a third 
of the actors in the international arena have adopted a new norm, it has passed a critical 
threshold for normative change, the tipping point. Finnemore and Sikkink see the process 
ending with the internalization of the norm, when it acquires “a taken-for-granted 
quality.”64 For them, internalization is not a continuous process of norm acquisition, but 
the end-state of this process, when a norm is internalized. Figure 1 shows Finnemore and 







   
   Stage 1 Tipping 
point 
     Stage 2 Stage 3 
Figure 1.   Norm life cycle 
In practice, not every norm evolves through all three stages. Many norms do not 
even reach the critical tipping point. Several factors influence the development within 
each stage. The emergence of new norms can basically be traced back to two elements: 
“norm entrepreneurs and organizational platforms from which the entrepreneurs act.” 
Norm entrepreneurs are the agents who promote a new norm, often driven by ideational 
commitment. Norm entrepreneurs construct cognitive frames based on what they regard 
as “appropriate or desirable behavior in their community” in specific situations. But “new 
norms never enter a normative vacuum”. New norms usually compete with existing 
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norms. Successful “frames resonate with broader public understandings and are adopted 
as new ways of talking about and understanding issues.” Organizational platforms  (like 
international organizations, governments or NGOs) can act as agents of norm diffusion, 
especially when they have an “advantage of resources and leverage over weak or 
developing states they seek to convert to their normative convictions.”65 
Norm cascades can be promoted primarily by international socialization. In 
international politics, socialization is fostered by material and immaterial sanctions and 
rewards, “sticks and carrots.” States comply with new international norms, mainly 
because of three motivations: legitimization, conformity, and esteem. International 
legitimization concerns the legitimacy accorded to a norm entrepreneur or organizational 
platform by a domestic constituency. The assumption is that a norm entrepreneur 
perceived as legitimate can more easily diffuse his norms, and vice versa. Conformity 
plays a role insofar as there is a desire to belong to the surrounding social environment. 
Elites adhere to international norms because “they want others to think well of 
them,...they want to think well of themselves,” and they want to “enhance national 
esteem.”66 
Other factors are also important for the diffusion of an international norm. The 
quality of the norm matters as does the reputation of the norm entrepreneur. Desirable 
norms and norms from actors with a high reputation are more likely to be adopted. 67  
The starting position is important since norm diffusion, as a process, encounters 
certain conditions in a target society that can be either enabling or obstructing for the 
adoption of international norms. The domestic situation has a direct influence on the 
rejection or acceptance of norms.68 Both enablers and obstacles can evolve as norm-
content related or process related. Relevant content-related conditions include the cultural 
and institutional context within which the norm diffusion takes place. Each society 
already has its distinct norms, values and belief systems. This body of norms determines 
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which choices and behavior are regarded as appropriate. However, what is regarded as 
appropriate in one society can differ significantly from appropriate behavior in another 
society or in the international community. Norm congruence between an international and 
a domestic norm can be low or high. Checkel calls the congruence of an international 
norm with a domestic norm cultural match, defined as “a situation where the 
prescriptions embodied in an international norm are convergent with domestic norms, as 
reflected in discourse, the legal system (constitutions, judicial codes, laws), and 
bureaucratic agencies (organizational ethos and administrative procedures).”69 Yet, this 
match is not a dichotomous condition, meaning that there either is or is not, a cultural 
match; however, the cultural match can be assessed instead within a spectrum ranging 
from a positive to a negative match. According to Checkel’s model to measure cultural 
match,  
at one end, there is a positive, (“+”) match, which indicates complete 
congruence between international and domestic norms in a particular issue 
area. In the middle, one has a null (“0”) match, where the domestic arena 
contains no obvious normative barriers to a particular systemic 
understanding. At the other end of the spectrum, one has a negative (“-“)  
match—a situation of no congruence between international and domestic 
norms.70 
The quality of the cultural match has repercussions on norm diffusion, since it can 
either hamper or accelerate the process. The greater the “cultural match...between a 
systemic norm and a target country” is, the faster norms spread and the higher “the 
probability that international norms will have constitutive effects.” On the other hand, the 
more an international norm differs from a domestic norm, the greater the normative 
conflict. This normative conflict can prevent or at least slow down the adoption of an 
international norm. A cultural mismatch usually creates distance and rejection of 
international normative prescriptions, while a cultural match produces positive resonance. 
The receptivity of the various domestic actors, especially of political elites, to accept new  
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international norms depends significantly on the cultural match, the existing belief system 
of the “adopter-society, their experience, norms, values, and intentions.”71 
The cultural match helps to determine the existing normative context of a society, 
that is, the starting position. If the domestic normative context differs from the 
international normative context, as is often the case in post-conflict situations, the next 
question is how normative change can be promoted.  
The empowerment of international norms matters. Finnemore and Sikkink stress 
that the aim “to reconfigure preferences, identity, or social context” requires addressing 
target societies both rationally and normatively. The ways in which new norms can be 
empowered have both a cognitive and an affective dimension. The findings suggest that 
decisions and behavior of political actors are driven by both utility maximizing (cost-
benefit) calculations and by norms. Thus, rational choice and constructivist theory can be 
applied complementarily in the norm diffusion process. “The utilities of actors could be 
specified as social or ideational as easily as they can be material. By making different 
assumptions about social relationships and ideational values, rational choice theorists 
provide interesting insights into the kinds of normative patterns that may develop and be 
stable.” Preferences and choices that result in observable behavior are influenced by both 
norms and rationality.72 “Processes of social construction and strategic bargaining are 
deeply intertwined.”73 People are not only motivated by one or the other. “Rationality 
cannot be separated from any politically significant episode of normative influence or 
normative change, just as the normative context conditions any episode of rational 
choice. [In social construction processes] norms and rationality are thus intimately 
connected.”74 
Two strategies can be applied that address rationality and normative aspects to 
make people accept new norms, a logic of consequence and/or a logic of appropriateness. 
The first strategy is based on the assumption that norm application can be enhanced 
through sanctions and incentives (“sticks and carrots”). This strategy is also referred to as 
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political conditionality. Norm compliance produces benefits for the norm adopter, norm 
non-compliance invites sanctions.75 Success of this strategy depends on the credibility of 
the conditionality and on the result of the balancing of external conditions with domestic 
adoption costs. The result of this calculation to a large degree determines whether states 
comply with or deviate from international norms. 
Domestic costs of compliance with norms are also affected by the role and the 
number of veto players.76 Schimmelpfennig and Sedelmeier hypothesize that “The 
likelihood of rule adoption decreases with the number of veto players incurring net 
adoption costs ... from compliance.”77 
The requirement to fulfill accession criteria, laid out in the Copenhagen Criteria 
as a sine-qua-non for aspirant countries of the European Union, is a good example of the 
leverage organizational platforms, like the EU, can exert on domestic transformation. The 
adherence to human rights, democratic norms, and the rule of law are prerequisites for 
EU membership. Overall, this nonnegotiable condition for membership enhanced the 
spread and the implementation of democratic norms in the aspiring countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe significantly.78 However, where domestic adoption costs are too high, 
states do not comply, such as happened in Slovakia.79 
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The logic of appropriateness is a strategy for international socialization. The 
strategy aims at voluntary rule-following. Inducement, “persuasion (rather than coercion) 
and “complex” learning (rather than behavioral adaptation)” are its primary means.80 In 
practice, both strategies might be applied in sequence or even in tandem to maximize 
effectiveness. The target groups include both the political elites and others in a potential 
adopter society. 
There are basically two ways to achieve norm empowerment in target societies, a 
“bottom-up” and a “top-down” approach. In the bottom-up approach, domestic agents 
promote norm change and try to influence political decision makers to change state 
policy. In this approach, political elites are not the first to internalize new norms. 
Decision makers might comply with international norms to avoid further vertical political 
pressure and/or to gain support from their constituencies. In addition to the pressure from 
below, elites are also exposed to horizontal pressure from international actors, often in 
parallel or coordinated (transnational coalition building) efforts. In contrast, according to 
the “top-down” approach first the elites adopt a norm, mainly through international 
bargaining. Since norm adoption and norm implementation require governmental 
decisions, the “top-down” approach focuses on the primary target group, produces 
quicker results, and therefore seems to be more effective. However, both horizontal and 
vertical pressure might produce resistance against norm internalization (psychological 
reaction, acting out) and delay or even prevent norm implementation. The long-term goal 
is that elites not just reluctantly accept pro forma norms imposed on them, but that they 
fully internalize new norms and values that guide their decision-making without the need 
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Many scholars argue that the domestic political structure is an additional factor 
influencing which approach produces the better result.82 Checkel distinguishes between 
four types of domestic political structure, Liberal, Corporatist, Statist, and State-Above-
Society and related mechanisms that produce the best result in norm empowerment. In 
states with a Liberal structure, policy is influenced “more from the bottom up than from 
the top down” and elites are more constrained. Therefore, the buildup of “societal 
pressure on elites” would be the preferred mechanism for such a society. Just the opposite 
approach works in a State-Above-Society where the state quasi controls society. “Elite 
learning” promises norm empowerment in such a society. The other possibilities both 
require a mix of the two approaches, but with different priorities. In the Corporatist 
structure, elites are more influential for normative change than in the Liberal case, but the 
different policy networks between state and society are still most important. In Statist 
states, elites are less influenced by other groups. Figure 2 summarizes Checkel’s 
argument.83 
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Figure 2.   Domestic political structure84 
The domestic context also determines how the salience and the legitimacy of an 
international norm are perceived within the adopter society. Salient norms quasi create an 
obligation for social actors to comply, any violation, “engender[s] regret or a feeling that 
the deviation or violation requires justification.”85 
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So far, norm diffusion has not been researched in the context of democratization 
processes in post-conflict situations. Closing this gap in the existing scholarly literature 
will be one of the major tasks of this thesis. This will contribute to more closely 
connecting IR theory and the conflict resolution field. 
C. NORM DIFFUSION IN POST-CONFLICT PEACE BUILDING 
Contemporary norm research has focused on how ideas can become reality and 
are translated into policies.86 Today, norms of democratic governance are equated within 
the international community with good governance. And even though the many 
peacebuilders are not unitary actors, they come predominantly from Western elites and 
share similar normative beliefs that they try to implant in war-torn societies. The 
particular characteristics of post-conflict situations offer a unique opportunity for 
international socialization and for the diffusion of democratic norms. Peace building 
agencies can be transmission belts, passing on good governance norms “from the 
international domain directly into the internal affairs of war-shattered states.”87 
The main characteristics of post-conflict situations are social disorientation, 
physical destruction, a difficult supply situation and a breakdown of public order. The 
latter three factors usually produce a need for external support and a short or long-term 
dependency on the international community. The degree of dependency mainly depends 
on the scale and the duration of the conflict as well as on its effects. Sometimes literally 
everything is in shambles, and states need to be rebuilt from scratch. The overall well-
being and standard of living in war-torn societies in general is much lower than before 
the war. No matter how deep, a conflict has left its marks on a country, and a post-
conflict situation leaves a large scope for action by the international community. In that 
situation, one can assume a significant power asymmetry between the international 
community and the target society. The power-dependence relationship is exceptionally 
one-sided and offers a good opportunity to apply the principles of conditionality since the 
target society has to accept conditions in exchange for external support. During that 
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support, the presence of the international community in the target society, in the form of 
various actors engaged in peace building activities, is typically high. Often, the partial or 
complete breakdown of state institutions in the post-conflict phase creates an 
administration gap that is often, at least temporarily, filled with a civil transitional 
administration like UNMIK in Kosovo or OHR in Bosnia.88 As long as there is no 
legitimate and accepted government within a state, “international governance may 
regulate the outward behavior of international actors such as states and, in addition, 
influence the behavior of actors within these states.”89 This form of direct governmental 
control through international agencies, which can lead to quasi-protectorates of long 
duration, takes place only in post-conflict situations and offers a unique opportunity to 
introduce and to implement new norms.  
The other condition in a post-conflict society, social disorientation, is prevalent 
especially in a defeated party to a conflict. Frequently, political and social changes follow 
defeat. But also refugees and traumatized victims, e.g., of ethnic cleansing, experience 
profound social disorientation.90 According to Eckstein, “rapid, large-scale contextual 
changes are personally disorienting and culturally disruptive” and war as a considerable 
contextual change can lead to social discontinuity and rapid reorientation.91 Finnemore 
and Sikkinkh also hypothesize that states which are in domestic turmoil or insecure about 
their international position will adopt new norms more readily. When people have lost 
trust in their leadership and political system, they are open for change and new ideas. 
“Ideas and norms most associated with the losing side of a war or perceived to have 
caused...failure should be at particular risk of being discredited, opening the field for 
alternatives.” When structure, order and stability are lost or shaken—as in a fragile post-
conflict situation—the opportunity to spread new norms is greatest, because wars “can  
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lead to a search for new ideas and norms.”92 Failure motivates complex learning, much 
more than success which is an insight that is captured in the learning through failure 
concept.93 
Even though peace building has often been portrayed as an ideologically neutral 
effort to assist states in the transition from war to sustained peace, norms play an 
important role in post-conflict peace building and these efforts are, de facto, not neutral.94 
In practice, post-conflict peace building operations often reshape “domestic and 
international relations as Western political, economic and social systems” are literally 
transplanted into other “parts of the world.”95 The “paradigm” of “liberal 
internationalism,” as Roland Paris found out, is the underlying concept of most peace 
building efforts. The fundamental principle “of this paradigm is the assumption that the 
surest foundation for peace, both within and between states, is market democracy, that is, 
a liberal democratic policy and a market-oriented economy.”96  
Current post-conflict peace building operations in different parts of the world 
share the same basic normative setup “of Western-style liberal market democracy.” 
Common characteristics of the preferred model for transition processes are the promotion 
of the basic elements of democracy,97 “free and fair elections, the construction of 
democratic political institutions, respect for civil liberties, and market-oriented economic 
reforms.” As a result, “several countries98...have emerged with new political institutions 
and policy preferences that replicate...the Western model,” in some cases even against  
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strong concurrent domestic strands.99 Such shifts underline how “international rules and 
norms have important effects by way of domestic political processes” especially in post-
conflict situations.100 
These results come about because the most influential international agencies are 
Western states or international organizations created or strongly influenced by Western 
states: “The international norms that peacebuilders have actually promoted in war-
shattered states have closely mirrored the domestic norms of the industrialized 
democracies.”101   
The key actors in post conflict peace building today are mostly the EU, NATO, 
the OSCE and the UN. Furthermore, even “most of the international NGOs...engage[d] in 
peace building” have the same attitude towards these principles.102  
Different mechanisms can be identified in post-conflict situations that empower 
international norms and bring “states into conformity:” bargaining, incentives and the use 
of formal authority. In practice, these mechanisms are often applied in the following way 
and sequence: First, “the model of liberal democratic domestic governance” is often 
promoted “during the negotiation of peace agreements among local belligerents.” 
Bargaining processes through third party mediation offer an excellent opportunity to 
diffuse norms, especially if “mediation with muscle” is practiced. Second, some 
“agencies explicitly require local parties to undertake political and economic 
liberalization policies in exchange for financial and other forms of international 
assistance.” Third, in most cases, international agencies use the opportunity to diffuse 
their norms, as long as they are in direct control over some aspects of administration. 
Furthermore, when a post-conflict peace building architecture is established, the 
personnel of the different international agencies tend to copy the familiar structures and 
procedures of their home countries and organizations.103 In the post-conflict situation 
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with its specific features, new political structures can be imposed and/or institutionalized 
long before the target society has changed its political culture and internalized 
international norms.104 The international community can use its leverage to embed an 
international norm in the constitution or in the legislation of the target society. In the best 
case, an international norm quickly becomes domestically salient, because a cultural 
match exists, the norm resonates with domestic norms and numerous energies are 
“devoted to its reproduction and reinforcement.”105 
International actors promote norm diffusion and empower international norms by 
incentives or by sanctions. Because the target society often depends on external help, 
power-dependence relationships favor the international community in its effort to diffuse 
peaceful and democratic norms. The terminology of “stick and carrot” describes the 
current diffusion strategy in peace processes most succinctly.106 For example, “the World 
Bank...since 1990 linked its financial assistance to political liberalization.” The World 
Bank gives financial assistance only when a democratization process takes place. Both 
the World Bank and the IMF base their “structural adjustment programs...on the premise 
that Western models of market economics and democracy are optimal...and mutually 
reinforcing.”107 It can be assumed that conditionality and issue-linkage have more effect 
in the close aftermath of a conflict than usual because the international community enjoys 
greater bargaining leverage. 
However, the manner in which norm change is promoted is important, since in the 
context of an international presence and/or administration different mindsets and cultures 
often clash. The worst case occurs when a cultural mismatch exists or when international 
norms are domestically perceived as cultural “imperialism.” Both situations are likely to 
produce resistance against international norms.108 It takes time to develop mutual trust 
and a common understanding. How can someone who has always lived in an autocratic 
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regime know what democracy is? How can someone who has always experienced a 
planned economy understand what a free market is? Particularly in the first stage, the 
perception of the norm entrepreneur, especially his reputation and thus legitimacy, is 
crucial. Has the norm entrepreneur been a party to the conflict? What relations did he 
have to the parties in the past? What can be expected from someone regarded as an 
infidel or as racially inferior?  
Another important part of social reconstruction is to help people to make the 
mental transition from war to peace, from conflict to cooperation and reconciliation. 
After long periods of living in war people get used to thinking in friend/enemy-images 
and in-group-/out-group dichotomies. It becomes hard for them to change and to accept a 
new situation, even if they had been longing for peace all along. To move from 
friend/foe-images to cooperation is especially difficult in a divided society. 
IR research has in recent years found out that, indeed, democracy promotes peace, 
but that transition processes as from war to peace, from autocracy to democracy or from 
central planning to market economy are highly instable and conflict-producing. Thus, 
“creating a stable market democracy is a tumultuous, conflict-ridden, and lengthy 
process, particularly in the fragile political environment of a war-shattered state.”  A 
principal flaw in the current approach to post-conflict peace building is neglecting that 
political and economic liberalization has destabilizing side effects which, in the worst 
case, can have just the opposite effect of what is intended. Both, democracy and 
capitalism encourage open competition. This is a key characteristic of these concepts. 
Divided societies in war-shattered states in the immediate post-conflict phase often 
cannot cope with that competition, because of a lack of institutional structures to resolve 
internal disputes peacefully.109  
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III. CASE STUDIES 
A. THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC110 
1. Post-Conflict Situation 
Imperial Germany, as one of the aggressor states in the First World War, had 
fought an offensive campaign mostly outside its own borders. When the war ended in 
1918, a large part of the German forces were still on foreign territory in the east and west. 
Therefore, atypically, for a country that had lost a war, Germany did not have to suffer 
the otherwise typical consequences of physical war damage and destruction within the 
country, although fighting in the east with the Poles and the Balts was bitter. Also, allied 
occupation of interwar Germany was only regional and temporary when compared to the 
case of 1944-55.111 Most importantly, the war had radicalized German society via the so 
called Entgrenzung des Krieges, whereby military elites had lost control of the monopoly 
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of war as it became a generalized phenomenon and German society was polarized even to 
the point of violent extremism in a manner that later proved fateful in Central Europe and 
beyond. Yet, the end of the war was a time of drastic change and instability for Germany. 
Woodrow Wilson’s requirement to negotiate peace only with representatives of a 
democratic government had led to the abdication of the German Emperor, the 
empowerment of the peace party in the Reichstag under Prince Max von Baden and to the 
formal change of the political system to democracy with Philip Scheidemann’s 
declaration of a Republic on November 9, 1918.112 
Although Wilson had made the transition to a parliamentary democracy a 
prerequisite for peace negotiations with the German Reich, the actual negotiations of the 
peace conditions were conducted without the Central Powers. Nevertheless, the Germans 
hoped for “Wilsonian peace conditions,” a just peace. Nobody was prepared for the 
actual outcome. The Versailles Treaty in no way reflected Wilson’s ideas of “a peace 
without victors;” instead, the treaty had a punishing and humiliating character. The allied 
demand that Germany accept the “war guilt” and consequently the full financial 
responsibility for all damages related to the war was fatal for both the national conscience 
and economic development.113 The peace conditions together with the stab in the back 
legend were perceived as unjust by all German parties,114 and as a “dictated peace,” and 
quasi unanimously rejected—a perception that was later, especially after World War II, 
also shared by many in Great Britain and the United States as a major cause of the rise of 
Hitler and the war.  
From the beginning, the new republic had to struggle with a charged domestic 
political situation of incipient revolt from the left and the right as well as the hostility of 
the international actors in the wake of the lost war. To bring the forces back home from 
France and Belgium, to demobilize millions of soldiers, and to integrate them into society 
and economy was only one challenge faced by the government of Scheidemann and Ebert 
who early on received the support of the army leadership against the perceived 
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“Bolshevik threat.” Other immediate challenges involved the need to improve a 
disastrous supply situation caused by shortages and hunger and to resist the many attacks 
against parliamentary democracy from all quarters. Politically motivated street fights 
were expressions of the revolutionary mood that prevailed at that time, and the outbreak 
of civil war seemed an imminent danger.115 
In face of the need to bring German forces back home and to guarantee internal 
security, the military was the most important institution for the new government.116 In the 
so-called Ebert-Groener-Pact from November 9, 1918, the chancellor accepted that the 
Oberste Heeresleitung (Supreme Command) would “continue its functions until the 
troops had been brought back to Germany in good order and perfect discipline” in 
exchange for governmental support to maintain discipline and order in the forces and for 
continued logistical support. Also, they agreed on a common effort by the officer corps 
and the new government to prevent Bolshevism.117 The new republic depended on the old 
elites and on the existing imperial institutions to cope with the manifold problems. This 
dependency prevented the democratization of state institutions, of the bureaucracy, of the 
judiciary, and of the military—a situation that would later prove fatal in the crisis of 
1930. 
2. Cultural Match 
The cultural match in the immediate post-conflict phase in Germany can only be 
assessed as negative (“-”). There was no experience with a multiparty parliamentary 
democracy in Germany; it had to grow, which, as we today know, leads to instable phases 
of democratic transition. Even more, the turn to democracy was not a free choice, but a 
result of defeat and external pressure. Hardly surprising, support for democracy was 
widely lacking in German society. Instead, the political culture in Weimar Germany was 
mainly characterized by authoritarianism, militarism and revisionism. 
The outbreak of the First World War had been greeted with enthusiasm. 
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Expectations were high and interest groups, such as the Kriegszielmehrheit (which 
represented the majority of the Reichstag from 1914 until 1916), and the 
Kriegszielbewegung (which represented economic associations) had set up a list of 
annexations that Germany would claim after the war. Public opinion, in the belief that 
Germany had been attacked by Russia, France, and England, and was defending the 
fatherland, was unaware of the real military development and practically supported the 
war until the end. Even when it became increasingly clear that Germany could not win 
the war, the army chiefs continued the war and opposed any attempt for peace 
negotiations. During the second half of the First World War the Oberste Heeresleitung 
under Hindenburg and Ludendorff, with the continued trust and support of the Emperor 
who repeatedly decided in favor of the military and against civilian politicians, de facto 
had erected a military dictatorship. The position of the Oberste Heeresleitung was so 
strong that the German Chancellor, Bethmann Hollweg and other politicians who 
opposed a continuation of the war effort, had to resign.118 
Only after the military initiative passed completely to the Western Powers, 
Ludendorff insisted on a quick end to the war. Wilson’s requirement to negotiate peace 
only with representatives of a democratic government led to the abdication of the German 
Emperor and to the formal transformation from a constitutional monarchy to a 
parliamentary democracy. The political parties that had voted for a “peace of 
understanding” and passed the so called Peace Resolution in the Reichstag on July 19, 
1917, the Deutsche Zentrumspartei (Centre Party) and the Sozialdemokratische Partei 
Deutschlands (German Social Democratic Party) became the founding members of 
Weimar. Although the Peace Resolution had little effect on the events that followed, 
political agitators could later use it as evidence for the lacking support of the democratic 
parties for the troops in the field and a divided homefront that caused the German 
military defeat, a blueprint for the Dolchstosslegende (stab in the back myth).119  
Democracy had adverse starting conditions in Weimar. An anti-democratic 
attitude prevailed in the inherited imperial institutions, foremost in the military and in the 
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administration.120 In its founding years, that is until 1924, the new republic repeatedly 
had to repel attacks from the right and from the left. The Kapp-Putsch in March 1920 
failed relatively quickly because of a joint action, or more precisely, joint inaction of 
workers and state officials, both adopting a “wait-and see-attitude,” and refusing to 
accept Wolfgang Kapp as a new authority. A general strike and passive resistance soon 
caused the rebellious leadership triumvirate of Wolfgang Kapp, General von Lüttwitz, 
and General Ludendorff to give up their project. In spite of this happy ending for the 
republic, the putsch left a strange residue. The Reichswehr (especially Hans von Seeckt) 
had de facto betrayed the Ebert-Groener-Pact by not supporting the government against 
the rebellion from the right with the notorious saying “Reichswehr schiesst nicht auf 
Reichswehr” (The Reichswehr does not shoot on the Reichswehr). Against the left, the 
military acted without hesitation as the Reichswehr and Freikorps (Free Corps) 
suppressions of the Communist riots in the Ruhr area demonstrated in 1919 through 
1921.121 
However, the government never undertook any steps for the democratization of 
the military, and the military sealed itself off from the proliferation of violence and armed 
groupings via a re-professionalization that was anti-democratic as well. More than in the 
Wilhelmine era, the Reichswehr maintained its special, seemingly ‘apolitical status,’ 
reformulated by Seeckt’s credo, and remained “a state within the state,” mostly lacking 
parliamentary control. The latter was hobbled by a lack of consensus on national defense, 
which was aggravated by the circumstances of peace in the early years. The Reichswehr 
was ready to defend Germany, especially in the East against Poland, but Seeckt saw 
democratic government as a passing phenomenon and sought to distance himself from the 
same, while embarking on his own policies.122 Three years later, Ludendorff struck again 
with the aid of the brown shirts. On November 9, 1923, he and Adolf Hitler tried to 
emulate the Fascist March on Rome. This insurgency also ended quickly at a time when 
Seeckt sought to inch towards military dictatorship amid the inflationary crisis of late-
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1923. This time, however, the Bavarian paramilitary police aborted the attempt with the 
use of force and arrested many of the insurgents.123 
Two lessons can be drawn from these events of the founding years of the republic 
by those interested in the general problem of state building and post-conflict 
reconstruction. One lesson was that the democratically elected government could not be 
sure of Reichswehr support against putsches from the right. Another lesson was that the 
legal system seemed to apply different standards against perpetrators from the right and 
from the left for crimes against the democratic order, and it generally favored the right.124 
The public service and its Beamte (civil servants of middle class rank) were not loyal to 
the Weimar Republic, although the constitution guaranteed such public employees a 
privileged status in society.125 
However, not only in its institutions, but in general, the political culture in 
interwar Germany was at its very best ambivalent or even hostile to democracy. Even 
though the Emperor had abdicated, there remained a considerable number of monarchists, 
especially among the middle class (bourgeoisie), that is, representatives of the estates and 
class that had long tried to suppress pluralism and democracy in Germany. This group 
was open to ideas that resembled the old social order. Backward-looking figures 
embraced updated versions of authoritarian rule, strong leadership and subordination as 
these principles were perceived as able to lead the country out of its misery and 
insignificance to renewed greatness. Therefore, authoritarian principles were even 
preferred to individual freedom in the pluralistic political system. That prevailing attitude 
also made it easy to link the ideological fight against the extreme left with the destruction 
of liberalism, socialism, internationalism and parliamentary democracy.126 
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The Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (National Socialist German 
Workers Party, NSDAP), as it emerged by 1923, benefited greatly “from the basic 
affinity towards it among the conservative upper classes in the army and civil service, in 
the lobbies of the agrarians, the bourgeoisie and industry. Their strong anti-republicanism 
led them to see themselves as potential allies of the Nazis.”127 Also, “universities were 
strongholds of anti-republicanism.”128 
The Nazis were not the only party that openly employed anti-democratic tactics 
against its opponents. The party spectrum in the Weimar Republic included leading 
entities as in the late Wilhelmine Empire was dominated by three main groups: the 
Deutsche Zentrumspartei, the Nationalliberale (National Liberals) and a small but 
rapidly-growing Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands.129 The socialists were the 
largest party in the early 1920s. After the abolishment of the monarchy, political power 
had shifted to the newly elected inexperienced representatives.130 These representatives 
did not rely on democratic procedures in solving political conflicts. Confrontation 
dominated over cooperation. As fateful as a phenomenon of political disintegration in 
post-conflict state building, was the proliferation of war, the spread of violence and the 
transformation of veterans’ organizations into outright political armies. Most parties even 
had a paramilitary suborganization that dealt with political opponents relying more on 
fists than on words. Particularly in times of economic crisis, democracy politically 
divided the German society, instead of unifying it.131 There were not enough moderates. 
A crucial implication of this competitive culture was that the necessary readiness for 
compromise was missing. The readiness for political compromise, to give and take, a 
prerequisite for lasting coalitions and thereby stable governments was missing and 
dampened the chances for democracy to survive.132 The lack of experience with 
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democratic processes, an undeveloped democratic culture where the need to compromise 
was not accepted, made it difficult to transform the existing political culture.133 
3. Norm Empowerment 
Thus, the conditions for the diffusion of democratic norms were not favorable in 
Weimar. All the more important was then the strong empowerment of these norms by 
external and internal factors to help them gain ground. None of the victors sought to 
promote the democratic consolidation of the vanquished powers, other than the empty 
promises of the 14 Points which were soon put to the lie by the perception of the peace in 
the so called Versailles Diktat, and later with the French-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr. 
Empowerment of democratic norms was weak throughout Weimar both domestically and 
internationally. Six factors played a major role: (1) the low reputation of the external 
norm entrepreneur because of the “Versailles complex”; (2) national myth-making, which 
idealized pre-war Germany in order to contrast it with the present; (3) the lack of 
empowerment by the domestic political elite (except for a few like Stresemann); (4) the 
actions of the “West” which turned out not only to weaken, but to hinder democracy 
empowerment, such as their handling of the reparation issue; (5) the deep socio-economic 
crisis following the Great Depression, which profoundly discredited the young 
democracy further as well as negated its ties to the Anglo-Saxon western powers who had 
stabilized the economy and society in 1924 and 1929 and promoted the polarization of 
society and politics; and (6) the weaknesses of a constitution that could be exploited by 
anti-democratic forces in times of crisis.  
The reputation of the norm entrepreneur was low, and democracy was 
emotionally linked to the lost war, an outcome for which the public had not been 
prepared until the final stages of the war.134 According to public opinion, Germany had 
not chosen democracy; democracy was imposed upon it by its democratic Western war 
opponents. It was a result of Wilson’s precondition for peace negotiations which came 
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quickly to be seen as a vast trick.135 It was therefore an irony of history that “those 
German politicians and parties which shared Wilson’s ideas concerning international 
understanding” had to accept the Versailles Treaty and its humiliating terms. Almost 
immediately, the acceptance of the peace conditions developed into an encumbrance for 
the fledgling democracy.136 It was the link between Versailles and the institution of 
democracy which proved disastrous. The political right now had a motive for its anti-
democratic propaganda and agitation. The term “November criminals” was coined by the 
far right for the German delegation that signed the Armistice and the Versailles Treaty.137 
The “stab in the back myth” gained increased popularity among the people who did not 
want to accept the shortcomings of German strategists, military reality and the fateful 
outcome of the First World War. The myth claimed that German forces had not been 
beaten in the field, but that Germany had lost the war on the home front, instead, due to 
declining morale. As with many myths, there is an element of truth to this, but due to the 
military’s almost total control over all aspects of war, including areas like supply and 
finance, it was the military that was responsible for the dire domestic situation.138 The old 
military leadership of the Wilhelmine period could successfully blame their failures “on 
the leading figures of the Weimar Republic.”139 The right held the republic responsible 
for the defeat at the home front and the “stab in the back myth” dominated the thinking of 
all national groups. Such a strong misperception of the military debacle could prevail 
because people had not been prepared for the unfavorable outcome of the war, and 
because the new government was not able to correct the widespread but false belief. 
The disappointment with the harsh conditions of the Versailles treaty reinforced 
anti-democratic feelings among the opponents of democracy.140 It also turned people, 
who had been in favor of democracy, against it. Many connected the imposed peace 
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conditions with the imposed political system. Especially for the patriotic middle class, the 
Versailles treaty was psychologically unacceptable as the restrictions put on Germany 
stood in sharp contrast to aspirations for greatness and world power.141 Since the 
democratic government had accepted the Versailles Treaty, agitation against the Republic 
occurred and “the politics of militarism, revolutionary and counter-revolutionary slogans, 
and direct action was on the ascendant.”142 
The First World War also had another effect on the political culture in interwar 
Germany. The shared war experience resulted in a strong and comprehensive nationalist 
integration that harkened back to the July and August days of 1914 as a legendary phase 
of national unity and people’s community and stood in seemingly stark contrast to the 
conflicts of a pluralist, yet still immature and polarized society and political class.  
German society had almost evolved into a politicized mass society “primarily via the 
nationalist experience of the war.” Especially the rural population, which so far had not 
been of primary interest as a constituency for the traditional parties, later became a 
breeding ground and a constituency for the National Socialist movement.143 The many 
war veterans were a critical mass: 
The sociological prototype of these movements was the returned and 
demobilized front soldier who either could not, or did not want to, return 
to civilian life. Instead he continued a life of adventure in the free camps 
and paramilitary associations which transposed to peacetime politics the 
experience of comradeship in the trenches, of a division of the world into 
friends and foes....144 
Many of these people gathered in paramilitary associations. In the interwar 
period, the methods of political combat, street fights, and low-level civil war often 
resembled the modes of conduct that these people had learned during their wartime 
socialization. The National Socialists could later apply aggressive methods since state 
institutions did not stop them. Like other nationalist movements, the Nazis “could count 
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on the basic support of the conservative leadership in the army and the bureaucracy.” 
Since the ideological bias of the elites and the majority of the people were directed more 
against the extreme left, they either tolerated violent action against the left or even 
secretly supported it.145 Domestically, democratic norms were rejected by elite groups 
and an increasing majority of the people. It was not possible to replicate the Western 
model against these strong domestic anti-democratic strands. 
Regarding its foreign policy only, the Weimar Republic scored some successes 
and was gradually reintegrating into the international community. One success was the 
treaty of Rapallo in 1922 which laid the foundations for diplomatic, economic, and even 
limited military cooperation with the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Russia relinquished 
rights to reparations.146 
Gustav Stresemann, a so called Vernunftrepublikaner (rational republican), was 
the main protagonist in German reintegration efforts in the European system, first during 
his short term as German chancellor, afterwards as foreign minister. Although 
Stresemann pursued a revisionist policy, he applied sensitive methods. Stresemann 
realized that after the lost war and because of the significant restriction of the military the 
preferred means for Germany's recovery and the realization of its goals towards its 
neighbors could only be “negotiation and conciliation.” Stresemann applied both.147 
As chancellor, Gustav Stresemann introduced a new currency, the Rentenmark, 
and countered inflation. Concomitantly, he ended the passive resistance against the 
Belgian and French occupation troops in the Ruhr area. That rational policy in dealing 
with the Ruhr crisis was later denounced as Erfüllungspolitik (fulfillment policy) of 
Allied demands.148 But, for Stresemann, a policy of give and take seemed promising at 
that time and showed results. The next problem he tackled was the reparations question. 
The United States was willing to assist Germany in its economic recovery and supported 
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Stresemann. The result was the Dawes Plan in 1924 which not only settled the 
reparations question at the time but also granted Germany a generous international loan. 
Within a year after the agreement of the Dawes Plan, allied forces withdrew from the 
Ruhr area. Gustav Stresemann, as foreign minister, and his French counterpart, Aristide 
Briand, successfully initiated a policy of convergence and a reconciliation process 
between their countries. Slow steps were taken to revise the Versailles Treaty and to 
reintegrate Germany into the international community.149 Further breakthroughs from 
postwar isolation were the Locarno treaty in 1925 and the admission of Germany into the 
League of Nations the following year.150 Other steps towards reconciliation with former 
opponents were the Briand-Kellog Pact and the acceptance of the Young plan of 1929, 
the final arrangement of the reparations question. Overall, Germany experienced a period 
of detente in its foreign relations after 1923 and a period of economic recovery.151 
Democracy thus managed to survive in spite of many internal and external pressures in 
the founding years of the new republic. The introduction of a new currency and American 
credits led to a period of relative economic and political stability, today remembered as 
the Goldene Zwanziger (Golden Twenties). 
However, although conditions became more stable in the twenties, the economic 
and political situation was still fragile, as demonstrated by the events that followed. The 
fairly stable phase of the Weimar Republic lasted only five years. It ended abruptly in 
1929 when two unfavorable developments coincided and reinforced each other in their 
negative effects. One was the Great Depression following the crash of the New York 
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In addition to the limited commitment of the international community to support 
the nascent democracy externally, the Great Depression, as an economic shock of large 
dimension, also significantly reduced their capabilities to stabilize democracy in 
Germany.153 
The Great Depression had economic, social and political implications on 
Germany. The number of the unemployed grew quickly and steadily. In 1929, three 
million were unemployed; in 1932, five million, and at the beginning of 1933, more than 
six million. Essentially, every third worker in Germany was unemployed. Furthermore, 
since many people were employed only part time, the economic situation was even worse 
than these official unemployment figures revealed.154 The unemployed and their families 
relied heavily on state benefits from a state that was going bankrupt without strong 
foreign investment.155 The high unemployment rate not only burdened the treasury, but 
also had social implications. “In a society where men’s prestige, recognition, and even 
identity ... derived above all from the job they did,” being unemployed “destroyed 
people’s self-respect and undermined their status.”156 
The Great Depression also had significant political implications. It’s first “victim 
was the Grand coalition cabinet led by the Social Democrat Hermann Müller.” Müller's 
cabinet was the last successful attempt of compromise between the ideological and social 
interests of the moderate left and right, the “Social Democrats and the ‘bourgeois’ parties 
left of the Nationalists...held together mainly by [the] common effort to secure the Young 
Plan.” The compromise lasted only until Gustav Stresemann died in 1929. After the 
People’s Party was deprived of its moderate leader, it left the coalition because the Social  
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Democrats refused to cut unemployment benefits. “From this point on, [not a single of 
the many fast changing] government[s] ruled with the support of a parliamentary majority 
in the Reichstag.”157 
Spoilers of the democratization process, i.e. reactionary and anti-democratic 
forces, monarchists and old elites, saw their chance to exploit the miserable economic 
and political situation. These spoilers gained an increasing influence in domestic politics 
and occupied high public offices. They could also increasingly use the weaknesses of the 
Weimar constitution to their advantage. 
The Weimar Constitution had been the result of compromise. As such it contained 
strengths and weaknesses. In retrospect, especially the strong position of the Reich 
President who very much resembled a “substitute monarch,” was a considerable 
weakness. Article 25 of the Weimar constitution permitted the president to dissolve the 
parliament (Reichstag); Article 48 allowed him to suspend basic rights. Both articles, in 
combination, were the means which partially legitimized the Reich President to exercise 
semi-authoritarian rule whenever he decided that public order was endangered and 
needed to be restored.158 Under Hindenburg, all the weaknesses of the Weimar 
constitution came to the fore.  
Another weakness was the proportional electoral law which caused a proliferation 
of parties. No reasonable threshold existed for a party to enter parliament, and 
consequently even the smallest parties were represented in the Reichstag.  The further 
and further fragmentation of the political arena made it more and more difficult to build 
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lasting coalitions among the many interest groups. In a period of only thirteen years, the 
Weimar Republic had twenty different cabinets.159 
Besides, the political fragmentation, first of the left, and then of the right, the 
overall strained situation favored the rise of anti-democratic parties. No consistency in 
politics, widespread discontent with the economic situation, growing problems for inner 
security (due to the many and strong paramilitary organizations, such as the “storm 
troopers” or the “red front fighters,”) a shrinking constituency in support of moderate 
parties, and successful antidemocratic propaganda were gradually wearing the republic 
down.  
After 1930, the Weimar Republic experienced a lasting political crisis, where 
political leaders who adhered to democracy and tolerance did not join forces. After the 
break-up of the Müller coalition, the Reichstag was dissolved and democracy de facto 
ceased to exist in the Weimar Republic with “the last Reich cabinet that had been formed 
on a parliamentary basis.”160  
On January 30, 1930, President Hindenburg nominated Heinrich Brüning as 
chancellor, and the first of a number of presidential cabinets was formed. The new 
government could not rely on a solid parliamentary base. Instead, it depended on the 
toleration of the majority of the parties in the Reichstag. When the government would not 
be tolerated, “it would govern without parliament by means of emergency decrees signed 
by the president and based on Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution.” Consequently, 
these semi-democratic presidential cabinets relied mostly on support of the president.161 
It has become widely believed that the Weimar Republic was a republic without 
democrats, because of the prevailing strong anti-democratic mood even among the 
political elites in moderate parties. Heinrich Brüning from the Catholic Centre Party can 
be regarded as more monarchist than republican. This characteristic was the decisive 
point for Hindenburg and his advisors in choosing and appointing him as chancellor. 
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When Brüning came into office, one of his aims was “to reform the constitution by 
reducing the power of the Reichstag” and to push back the Social Democrats’ political 
influence.162 
Brüning’s strategy for dealing with the economic situation only made bad things 
worse.163 Economic effectiveness had always been a criterion for political capability in 
Germany. That was valid for the state of Prussia, for Wilhelmine Germany, and also for 
the Weimar Republic. This had a strong influence on the perception of and the attitudes 
towards the democratic regime. Disillusion with the way policy was carried out and 
further disappointment with democracy spread among the German people.164 The 
economic decline led to a radicalization of politics that especially benefited the extreme 
right.165  
The NSDAP gained acceptance and popularity. The confusion after the Great 
Depression created all the prerequisites needed “for a splinter party to gain a mass 
following in a relatively short time and to become a power on the electoral scene,…an 
explosive situation in domestic and social affairs..[and] a state of acute political, social, 
economic and psychological crisis.”166 The German population became more and more 
ideologically divided; fear of the future shaped political preferences; many people “were 
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politically disoriented, socially isolated and economically insecure.”167 Moderate 
conservative parties did not get enough support from their constituencies towards the end 
of Weimar, the moderate middle shrank, and the extremists gained.168 
What happened in Germany was not unique but represented a trend in European 
politics in general. One has only to consider the case of a similar development in Austria, 
to say nothing of Italy.  The international environment was not supportive of democracy 
in these years. Immediately after the end of the First World War, many European states 
had established a liberal democracy on paper following Wilson’s campaign for 
democracy. But democracy did not always prevail in interwar Europe, and one country 
after the other fell back into authoritarian rule. The Fascists under Mussolini seized 
power in Italy in 1922; Primo de Riviera set up a military dictatorship in Spain in 1923, 
and Poland experienced a military coup in 1926. In the same year, a dictatorship was 
installed in Portugal, and three years later in Yugoslavia. When the Great Depression 
evolved, “one government after another moved rightwards.” Europe experienced the so 
called “crisis of democracy.” Democracy survived only in the northern parts of Europe.169 
4. Outcome 
In 1919, the American president Woodrow Wilson optimistically proclaimed that 
the world had “been made safe for democracy.”170 Yet, the Weimar Republic, the second 
attempt to establish democracy in Germany,171 lasted only fourteen years. “The Republic 
was born in defeat, lived in turmoil and died in disaster,” as Peter Gay describes the 
Weimar period.172 
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It was Hitler’s hour. In his election campaigns, Hitler played on the negative 
public attitude towards the Weimar Republic by stressing the internal divisions, the 
fractionized political landscape, economic failure, and the responsibility of the Weimar 
Republic for Germany’s humiliation by the Versailles Treaty. Hitler told the people what 
they wanted to hear. He offered a counter-vision to Weimar, a united and strong Germany 
with a proud society, a Volksgemeinschaft (a racial community) without social borders 
that would rebuild Germany “and restore the nation to its rightful place in the world.” 
Effective and efficient propaganda delivered these messages to the German people and 
was tailored according to the specific audience.173 
Nazi propagandists understood mass psychology, and they “worked on a crude 
mixture of discontent composed of nationalist, racialist, anti-Semitic, anti-Marxist and 
anti-liberal prejudices, together with a sense of awaiting a leader which was widespread 
in Germany in the 1920s.”174 Public appearances of the Nazis in closed formations 
actively supported the impression of a strong movement, with discipline and order, under 
a determined leader.175 Joining the joint campaign of the “Reich Committee” against the 
Young Plan in 1929, although the plebiscite failed, gave the NSDAP increased popularity 
in the nationalist camp.176 
Anti-democratic propaganda was a decisive factor for the rise of the NSDAP, 
visible in the unexpected result in the national elections of September 1930.177 In only 
                                                 
173 Evans, 257. 
174 Before the Great Depression and its effects, Germans had not been very receptive to National 
Socialist propaganda. In 1928, the NSDAP had the status of a splinter party that received only 2.6 per cent 
of the votes in the May elections. See Kolb, 99, 103. 
175 Broszat, 3. 
176 In a trial against three officers, who had joined the Nazi Party, Hitler announced that he would 
achieve power by legal means. This was a clear indication that he had left the putschist approach of 1923 
behind and his so called “legality oath” received much applause in the army and in conservative circles. 
Ibid., 23, 76-77. 
177 The NSDAP was able to build “an image of strong, decisive action, dynamism, energy and youth 
that wholly eluded the propaganda efforts of the other political parties” National Socialism projected the 
image of more than a political party; it projected itself of being a movement which would bring a better 
future for the German people. This positive image was created, even though the propaganda and the 
NSDAP program lacked the necessary concrete ideas of how to solve the problems of that time; however, 
that “vagueness seemed to be more of an advantage than a disadvantage, because it allowed every voter to 
read what he wanted to. Evans, 265. 
 55
two years, the National Socialists increased their number of seats in the Reichstag from 
12 to 107 which meant an increase from 0.8 to 6.4 million votes. The National Socialists 
had gained support from voters of all social classes, among them first time and 
inexperienced voters, but also many of “the older generation, who evidently no longer 
considered the Nationalists vigorous enough to destroy the hated Republic.” The Nazis 
also gained over proportional support from female voters and from voters living in north 
Germany, east of the Elbe, or in rural areas.178 The surprising results of the September 
1930 elections turned the NSDAP into a potential coalition partner. 
In the votes for Reichspräsident in March 1932, Hindenburg won with only a 
slight majority against Hitler, an event that also demonstrated the latter’s increased 
popularity. Two months later Brüning resigned, after losing Hindenburg’s support. The 
governments in the last year of the republic under Franz von Papen, and Kurt von 
Schleicher, were short-lived and dependent on Hindenburg’s goodwill.179 
In the summer elections in 1932, the NSDAP doubled its votes; democratic 
parties together gained only 38 percent. The majority of the German people had decided 
against the moderate democratic parties. In the last elections of the Weimar Republic, on 
November 6, 1932, the NSDAP lost four percent of the votes.180 Only two months later, 
Hindenburg appointed Hitler as chancellor, on January 30, 1933, at a time when the 
NSDAP had already passed the zenith of public approval, and the Third Reich was born. 
A multiplicity of intertwined exogenous and endogenous factors eventually 
caused the failure of the democratization attempt of Weimar Germany, but the influence 
of the cultural mismatch and the weak norm empowerment was strong among them. In 
retrospect, it does not follow conclusively that the new democracy was doomed to failure. 
Although the Weimar Republic had such an unfavorable starting position, it handled the 
imminent challenges and first crises surprisingly well. The dependency of the new 
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government on existing imperial institutions, however, prevented the democratization of 
the state-bureaucracy, judicial, military, and even the educational system. All of these 
institutions were still imbued with the conservative spirit of the German Empire and did 
not actively support democracy.181 The cultural gap never closed; instead, it increased 
over time. Due to a few committed democrats and many “rational” republicans, the 
republic survived the initial storms and even experienced a phase of relative stabilization, 
the “Golden Twenties.” However, after 1929, the republic could not cope with the 
renewed economic decline and its political, social and psychological consequences. Even 
people who had made their peace with the new regime increasingly mistrusted 
democracy. 
Instead of cultivating a more democratic culture from within and from without,  
norm empowerment by internal as well as external actors was largely missing; the 
burdens of the past and the unfortunate developments strengthened the circle of 
reactionary domestic forces that rejected democracy. The political culture deteriorated 
further under economic crisis and increasing political radicalization. The economic crisis 
turned out to be a crucial intervening variable in the democratization process. When the 
effects of the Great Depression hit Germany, anti-democratic forces gained the upper 
hand over moderate ones, abused the constitution, conspired with the old elites, and 
gradually destroyed the unwanted republic.182  
All prior successes of the young democracy paled in face of the deteriorating 
circumstances. No success could counterbalance the widespread perception that things in 
Germany had developed for the worse because of the imposed democratic system. The 
legacy of a defeat that was not accepted by a backward looking society, the prevailing 
stab-in-the-back-myth, and effective anti-democratic propaganda, all had implications for 
the Zeitgeist (spirit of the times) that was not in favor of democracy. Weimar had a new 
constitution, but people had not changed their attitudes and preferences.183 
                                                 
181 Funke, 82. 
182 Bracher, 6. 
183 Greiffenhagen, 19. 
 57
B. THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY184 
1. Post-Conflict Situation 
                                                 
184 The case on the Federal Republic of Germany regards the development in the three Western 
occupation zones in the period between 1945 until 1989. The chapter is based on the following 
publications: Donald Abenheim, Soldier and Politics Transformed: German-American Reflections on Civil-
Military Relations in a New Strategic Environment (Berlin: Carola Hartmann Miles, 2006); Donald 
Abenheim, Reforging the Iron Cross: The Search for Tradition in the German Armed Forces (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1988); Gabriel A. Almond and Sydney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963); Ernst Bruckmüller, Wiederaufbau in Österreich, 1945-
1955:Rekonstruktion oder Neubeginn? (Wien: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 2006); Dirk Berg-
Schlosser, „Entwicklung der Politischen Kultur in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,“ Aus Politik und 
Zeitgeschichte 7 (1990): 30-46. Dirk Blasius, „Von Bismarck zu Hitler: Kontinuität und 
Kontinuitätsbegehren in der deutschen Geschichte,“ Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B 51 (1998): 3-10. Karl 
Dietrich Bracher, „Der erste Demokratieversuch und seine Folgen,“ Die politische Meinung 358 (1999):5-
19. Robert A. Dahl, On Democracy (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1998);  Victoria de 
Grazia, Irresistible Empire: America’s Advance through 20th-Century Europe (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005);Alex N. Dragnich and Jorgen S. Rasmussen, Major 
European Governments, seventh edition (Chicago, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1986). John S. Duffield, 
“NATO’s Functions after the Cold War,” Political Science Quarterly, 109:5, (1994/5): 763-787. Bernd 
Faulenbach, „Überwindung des deutschen Sonderweges?: Zur politischen Kultur der Deutschen seit dem 
Zweiten Weltkrieg.“ Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B 51 (1998): 11-23. Herman Finer, Governments of 
Greater European Powers: A Comparative Study of the Governments and Political Culture of Great 
Britain, France, Germany, and the Soviet Union (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1956). Norbert 
Frei, “Coping with the Burdens of the Past: German Politics and Society in the 1950s,” in The Postwar 
Challenge: Cultural, Social, and Political Change in Western Europe, 1945-58, edited by Dominik 
Geppert, 27-39 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). Manfred Funke, „Deutschland 1905 bis 2005: 
Gedenkjahre im Zehner-Pack,“ Die politische Meinung 50 (2005): 10-16. Dominik Geppert, 
“Introduction,” in The Postwar Challenge: Cultural, Social, and Political Change in Western Europe, 
1945-58, edited by Dominik Geppert, 1-23 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). Martin Greiffenhagen, 
„Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1945 – 1990: Reformen und Defizite der politischen Kultur,“ Aus Politik 
und Zeitgeschichte 1-2 (1991):16-26; John H. Herz, “Denazification and Related Policies,” in From 
Dictatorship to Democracy: Coping with the Legacies of Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism, edited by 
John H. Herz, 15-38 (Westport and London: Greenwood Press, 1982); Wolfgang Ismayr, „50 Jahre 
Parlamentarismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,“ Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B 20 (1999):14-26. 
Konrad H. Jarausch, After Hitler: Recivilizing the Germans: 1945-1995, translated by Brandon Hunziker 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). Karlheinz Niclauß, „Bestätigung der Kanzlerdemokratie?: 
Kanzler und Regierungen zwischen Verfassung und politischen Konventionen,“ Aus Politik und 
Zeitgeschichte B 20 (1999): 27-38., Daniel E. Rogers, Politics After Hitler: The Western Allies and the 
German Party System (New York: New York University Press, 1995); Gordon R. Smith, Democracy in 
Western Germany: Parties & Politics in the Federal Republic, second edition (New York: Holmes & 
Meier, 1982); Rolf Steininger, Der Staatsvertrag:Österreich im Schatten von deutscher Frage und Kaltem 
Krieg 1938-1955 (Innsbruck: Studien Verlag, 2005);Toby Thacker, “Playing Beethoven like an Indian: 
American Music and Reorientation in Germany, 1945-1955,” in The Postwar Challenge: Cultural, Social, 
and Political Change in Western Europe, 1945-58, edited by Dominik Geppert, 365-386 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003). Sidney Verba, “Germany: The Remaking of Political Culture,” in Studies in 
Political Development 5: Political Culture and Political Development, ed. Lucian W. Pye and Sidney 
Verba, 130-170 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965); Klaus Weinhauer, Schutzpolizei 
in der Bundesrepublik: Zwischen Bürgerkrieg und Innerer Sicherheit: Die turbulenten sechziger Jahre 
(Paderborn: Schöningh, 2003); Friedrich Wilhelm, Die Polizei im NS-Staat: Die Geschichte ihrer 
Organisation im Überblick (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1999).  
 58
The case of the western zones of occupation of Germany and later the Federal 
Republic forms a counterpoint to the case that has preceded this one as well as that which 
follows it. The Second World War in Europe ended with the unconditional surrender of 
Germany on May 8, 1945. After almost six years of all-out war, massive allied bombing 
campaigns and extensive fighting on German soil, both physical destruction and social 
disorientation were immense. Much of the country literally lay in ruins. Many urban 
areas, the transport and communication infrastructure, and the industrial sites had been 
destroyed. Public order had broken down. Millions of Germans were homeless or 
internally displaced. Millions of refugees from the eastern territories that Germany lost as 
a consequence of the military defeat—from Silesia, Pomerania, East Prussia, and from 
the Sudeten area—had fled to the western parts of Germany.185 The overall supply 
situation in Germany was extremely critical.186 
The victorious powers, Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union and the United 
States occupied the whole of Germany. Towards the end of the war, in February 1945, at 
the Conference of Yalta, the Allies had agreed on common principles for their occupation 
policy. These principles were confirmed after Germany’s capitulation at the subsequent 
Potsdam Conference in August 1945. In the Potsdam program the Allies set four general 
political aims regarding the treatment of Germany, later known as the four Ds: 
“Demilitarization, Denazification, Democratization, and Decartelization.”187  
Four occupation zones were established, one for each of the victorious powers 
and, in addition, a French occupation zone. The victors filled the administration gap that 
resulted from the breakdown of the party/state government of the Third Reich and 
exercised direct control. In the Western zones, self-government was restored 
successively, first to the municipalities, then on the level of the newly reformed 
“Bundesländer,” (there were no more Gaue or Kreise of the NSDAP) finally on the 
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federal level in 1949 with the first parliamentary elections and the formation of the 
Adenauer government. In parallel, allied control was relaxed, with the Petersberg 
Agreement of 1949, the “Deutschlandvertrag” of 1952 and the Treaties of Paris in 1955 
as major milestones in the formation of the Federal Republic and its progress from 
vanquished territory to member of the western alliance. In the first years, the four military 
governors were the ultimate authorities for all decisions in the respective occupation 
zones. Decisions concerning the whole of Germany were taken in the Allied Control 
Council (ACC), comprised of the four military governors and located in Berlin. The ACC 
fulfilled its governmental functions until March 1948, when the military governor of the 
Soviet Union left the institution due to disagreements about the political and economic 
administration of the respective German Länder and the evolving Cold War.188 
During the occupation phase, the three democratic powers, France, Great Britain 
and the United States of America tried to expunge the Nazi stain of state and to 
encourage or outright impose liberal, Christian and or social democracy on Germany. In 
face of the difficult circumstances and the many challenges of the postwar situation in 
1945, ranging from the need for an almost complete reconstruction of the infrastructure 
and the economy to the creation of a new political structure up to the Nuremberg Trials, 
the task was even more daunting than in 1918 as the dimension of the defeat was far, far 
greater and the nature of the Nazi regime was hegemonic and genocidal. 
2. Cultural Match 
It seems to be a paradox: the cultural match in the aftermath of the Second World 
War was negative (“-”), even more so than in 1918; however, the starting conditions for 
successfully implanting democracy in Germany were better.  
The Third Reich was able to build on and to cultivate traditional German attitudes 
and carry these to an extreme.189 The political culture in the “post-Fascist society” in 
1945 was similar to that towards the end of the Weimar Republic, mainly characterized 
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by “militarism, nationalism, and statism.”190 Authoritarian attitudes and behavior 
persisted in a society that had experienced and widely supported twelve years of 
totalitarianism with a one-party system that had impacted almost all dimensions of life. 
The majority of the German people had “accepted the NS [National Socialist] 
dictatorship until the bitter end.”191 The year 1945 thus was indeed a turning point in 
German history; it was not a Stunde Null (zero hour), since the past continued to affect 
the evolution of the German collective identity.192 Political cultures never start from 
zero.193 Due to a long illiberal tradition, Germans were used to, and inclined toward 
hierarchy and authority.194 In particular, the German bureaucracy enjoyed high prestige, 
although it had made common cause with the NSDAP (i.e. armed forces, judiciary, 
diplomatic corps, legal profession and university professors…) and had been transformed 
by it.  People were used to being told the rules and to obeying them instead of actively 
participating in democratic processes. Many Germans still favored “the hierarchical, 
orderly system of the [Wilhelmine] Empire.”195 Even though the young democracy could 
very well hark back to indigenous democratic traditions, such as during the Vormärz of 
post-Napoleonic Germany, democracy did not have a good reputation among Germans 
after the disappointing experience with the Weimar Republic. Even ten years after the 
end of the war, half of the population in the Federal Republic of Germany thought that 
National Socialism was basically a good idea that was only realized improperly, and that 
without the lost war, Hitler would have been a great statesman. Thus, there was much 
more continuity in German political culture than widely perceived today from hindsight.  
However, after 1945, Germans were nevertheless mentally prepared for a regime 
change.196 The major reasons were the profound failure of the lost war as well as a 
growing disillusionment with the NSDAP, if not with the personality of the Führer 
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himself, in turn from 1943 onwards, thereby stimulating a process of social learning. 
World War II was a branching point for German culture because the total defeat 
profoundly discredited the former belief system and generated an opening for the 
democratic alternative. The introduction of democracy by the Western allies, through a 
combination of coercion and inducement, thus fell on fertile ground. 
Although there were many similarities between the German political culture after 
1945 and 1918, there were also crucial differences. The totalitarian Third Reich had 
ended in total war and military defeat as did the Wilhelmine Empire. But unlike 1918 the 
totality of the defeat was obvious to the mass of people in total war and its corresponding 
form of defeat and could not be denied or presented as the result of another “stab in the 
back.”197 Yalta and Potsdam were not another Versailles, not perceived as an illegitimate 
Schmachfrieden (humiliating peace) that bred revisionism. People were tired of war and 
suffering.198 
Besides, there was a vacuum in leadership. The prominent political leaders of the 
Nazi era had either fled the country, were dead, in hiding, or imprisoned in Allied 
detention camps.199 As a consequence, “the legitimacy of the old political system was 
shattered with no new one to take its place.”200 Structure, order and stability were lost or 
at least profoundly shaken in postwar Germany. New elites had to be recruited. People 
were uncertain, disillusioned with Nazism, cynical or even apathetic regarding politics. 
This social disorientation after the Second World War offered an opportunity to spread 
new norms much more so than after the First World War.201 
However, the Allies had to constitute a democratic state “for an estranged people, 
without thereby sliding back into the horrors of an extensive nationalism.” Even so, the 
Allies could build their democratization project on some domestic support since there 
was “a sizable minority of Weimar democrats, resistance survivors, and returning 
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émigrés … [who were] ready to make a fresh start that drew on minority traditions of 
democracy,” such as Konrad Adenauer or Kurt Schumacher.202  
And there was no alternative than to recruit the main body of a new democratic 
leadership from the generation that had already been involved in politics during the 
Weimar Republic, “since one generation had been made away with in the concentration 
camps or war.”203  Further, one was prepared to accept back into life many of the rank 
and file of the NSDAP and its branches, a process which made itself felt if not 
immediately in 1946 or 1947, then surely once the Korean War began and normalcy took 
hold in the course of the 1950s.  
3. Norm Empowerment 
After the Second World War, the Euro-Atlantic community had a strong interest 
in the post-conflict development of Germany, and the willingness and the commitment to 
implement the principles of the Potsdam program were high among the western 
occupation powers. The overall goal was a fundamental change of the political culture, 
“the re-education of the Germans” from an authoritarian to a democratic society; and that 
goal could be reached.204 Focused on this aim, the western Allies used their transitional 
governmental authority to destroy the totalitarian institutions in Germany and to replace 
them with democratic ones.205 In addition, applying the important lesson of Weimar that 
a formal change to democracy was not sufficient, the Allied interim authorities 
empowered democratic norms wherever and whenever possible. Demilitarization and 
denazification were the primary means towards that target during the occupation phase.206 
Six factors played a major role in the successful democratization process of 
Germany after 1945: (1) the effective prevention of actual or potential spoilers in politics; 
(2) the democratization of state institutions (military, police, legal system,) and of the 
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academia and of the media; (3) a broad reorientation program; (4) an active process of 
coming to terms with the past that also laid the foundation for international reconciliation 
and for the integration in Euro-Atlantic structures; (5) a high reputation of the norm 
entrepreneur; and (6) an appropriate constitution coupled with a favorable economic 
development.  
The main spoilers of the democratization process in the Weimar Republic, the 
military and the East-Elbian Junkers had no influence on the democratization process of 
Germany after the Second World War, since both groups were no longer existent in the 
western occupation zones in any meaningful way.207 The military had been dissolved and 
the territory east of the Elbe belonged to the Soviet occupation zone or to Poland. The 
demilitarization of Germany had been a primary aim of the Allies. Already in September 
of 1945 the ACC had decreed the demobilization and dissolution of all German military 
forces and of the various military and paramilitary sub-organizations, even if both sides 
kept a certain, limited number of Wehrmacht veterans in various kinds of auxiliary 
uniforms.  No redux of the Groener-Ebert telephone call a la 1945 could save the 
Wehrmacht, to say nothing of the Waffen SS (Schutzstaffeln, protective squadron) or 
Reichsarbeitsdienst (Reich labor service).  The Allied policy went even “beyond the 
destruction of the military as an institution”: such an effort “aimed at draining the social 
and cultural sources of militarism,” at interrupting the German military tradition, and at 
discrediting the military as a whole. This policy was very effective both in the short-term 
as well as in the long-term perspective; it has repercussions on German society still 
today. 
In contrast to the war cult in Germany after the First World War, the population 
rejected war broadly in the aftermath of the Second World War. There was an overall 
antiwar mood in the population after almost six years of war that had consumed members 
of almost every family. With almost no exceptions, demobilized soldiers yearned for a 
return to civilian life. The nature of the defeat, the brutality of the war, the failures of 
generalship and the ruthlessness of military justice in the final phase of the war, as well 
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as the common knowledge that much of the war had been waged with a mercilessness at 
variance with the Prussian tradition loomed large in the experience of millions of 
embittered men and women at arms. Many of them had experienced a term of undignified 
captivity in an Allied prisoner of war camp and that experience, in many cases, had also 
contributed to a change in their personal attitudes towards war. The demilitarization 
program and its result, the “discrediting of the military provided a unique chance to 
acquire new, more peaceful values and norms of behavior.”208 The intense domestic 
debate about and the fierce resistance within the German population against armament in 
the Federal Republic of Germany, beginning a half decade after the end of the Second 
World War, demonstrated clearly how successful the demilitarization of Germany and the 
internalization of peaceful norms had been. 
The German contribution to the defense of the West, the force that became known 
as Bundeswehr (German Armed Forces) in the mid-1950s, was founded as an army in a 
democracy with unique characteristics. Strict parliamentary control, including the new 
institution of a Wehrbeauftragter (parliamentary commissioner of the armed forces), and 
conscription secured civilian control and transparency of the military with a leading role 
of parliament. The internal military culture, visible in the way in which those who serve 
are treated, reflects the character of the Bundeswehr as an army in a democracy. Within 
the concept of Innere Führung, the term Staatsbürger in Uniform (citizen in uniform) 
expresses the image of a citizen soldier who keeps his rights and duties as a citizen during 
his term in the military; is loyal to the constitution; and ready to defend both the country 
and its democratic system.209  Furthermore the new German military was integrated into 
pan-European/Atlantic structures, firstly with the plans for the European Defense 
Community and then after 1955 into NATO. Thus, the Bundeswehr was integrated dually 
within the democracy of the Federal Republic of Germany and within the Atlantic 
alliance of democracies.  This solution stands in starkest possible contrast to the fate of 
the Reichswehr, an army which stood on its own, as it were, and relied on a foundation of 
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anti-democratic traditions and an international system that was anything but conducive to 
the formation of democracy in the first German republic.210 
The German police could not be dissolved like the military had been after 1945, 
out of concern for internal security, although a checkered effort was made to denazify, it 
granted its former control by the SS. Declining over time, the Allied occupation force 
presence was strong but not strong enough to counter the manifold criminal activities that 
emerged after the end of the war, especially the black market. Germans had to contribute 
to that task. With the aim to enhance the reliability of the German police and to turn the 
police from an instrument of oppression that it had been in the totalitarian state into a 
pillar of democracy, police units were purged of Nazis, refreshed with new recruits with 
an unblemished personal record, and retrained by the allies. Even new police uniforms 
were designed to reflect the different mindset of the institution to the German 
population.211 Even so, an alarming number of ex-SS and Gestapo men endured in the 
police forces of the Federal Republic of Germany.212 Also, only few former Nazis were 
removed from judicial positions.213 
Denazification was the second principle of the Potsdam program equally 
important as the demilitarization of German society. Its aim was to remove potential 
spoilers from state institutions, public offices and from politics who could obstruct the 
pacification and democratization process. The efficiency of the denazification program 
was often questioned because of the way it was conducted. In a first step, the NSDAP and 
its organizations were dissolved and banned. Yet, more difficult than the formal 
dissolution of political institutions was to identify who had been, or still was, an active 
Nazi. An identification process was necessary in order to recognize dedicated Nazis and 
to remove them from public office or to deny them access to responsible positions. The 
identification procedure changed over time. In the U.S. occupation zone, for example, 
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initially, people were expected to answer an infamous questionnaire and to give 
information voluntarily about their engagement in Nazi affairs. Later, the identification 
process was conducted by Germans under Allied supervision. So called German review 
boards were entrusted with the task of categorizing their fellow countrymen into four 
categories: Chief Nazis, Nazis, Lesser Nazis or Exonerated. Although both procedures 
might have resulted in “whitewashing,” denazification proved quite effective in the 
beginning. No matter how convinced of National Socialism some people still might have 
been at that time, it would have been self-sacrificing to be categorized as a Chief Nazi or 
as a Nazi. The program had a strong deterrent effect, because “without a certificate of 
exoneration [the so called Persilscheine, or soap certificate] there was no chance of 
holding onto a normal job.”214 It might not have been possible to remove all former 
members of the NSDAP from responsible positions, because “without expert knowledge 
the administration and economy of the occupied country would have quickly broken 
down;” however, their political influence was neutralized. Besides, National Socialism as 
an ideology was discredited, and the further spread of Nazi ideas effectively prevented by 
the successes of western integration and by the self evident pleasure of normalcy and 
consumerism.215 
The denazification process was complemented by a broad Allied reorientation 
program aimed more directly towards a change in German political culture, especially to 
create a breach with radical nationalism and to empower democratic norms, also from the 
bottom. The old elites had been removed and National Socialism as an ideology was 
largely discredited. The horrendous effects of the Holocaust were widely publicized by 
the victors and later by Germans themselves. The broad population, particularly the next 
generations, was exposed to the new democratic norms provided by the Allies. The 
reorientation program started in the information and education networks. First, all 
German media with a Nazi past were forbidden and replaced by Allied media. Later, 
“reliable [democratic] German publishers and journalists [were] licensed to issue their 
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own publications.” Schools and universities were also purged of Nazis as were the police 
and other public institutions and replaced by personnel with an unblemished record.216 
This effort was not wholly successful, but in the end it worked overall.  Even musical 
reconstruction was part of the Anglo-Saxon “Information Control” campaign to reorient 
the “German mind.”217 In the Federal Republic of Germany democratic norms were 
further promoted through various efforts of politische Bildung (political education) in 
different institutions to promote a more sophisticated approach to mass politics than the 
apolitical ideal of the German bourgeoisie of the 19th century.  
However, it took time domestically to deal with the legacies of the recent past. 
During the early reconstruction phase the legacies of the Third Reich were tabooed by 
many. Instead, “Allied disclosures of the National Socialist atrocities during the 
Nuremberg Trial and subsequent court cases created shock and outrage among the 
defeated, who refused to believe them.” Only after international pressure and media 
campaigns was the German self-stylization as victims of the Nazi regime eventually 
replaced by “a more self-critical approach to the past.”218 The debate about collective and 
individual guilt contributed to this process. 
Norbert Frei distinguishes three phases in the domestic process in which Germans 
mastered their recent past: the politics of purge between 1945 until 1949, the 
Vergangenheitspolitik (policy of the past) from 1949 until the mid-1950s, which was one 
of inclusion of some of those marginalized by the purge phase and the period of 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung (coming to terms with the past) starting in the mid-1950s 
until the 1980s.219 The phases demonstrate that denazification was all but a linear process 
with self-evident results. 
After Germany regained partial sovereignty in the newly founded Federal 
Republic, the first German chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, did not continue the Allied 
denazification process. Driven by a widespread public mood “to forget about the past,”  
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or by anger at what was called victor’s justice at Nuremberg, Adenauer’s 
Vergangenheitspolitik was characterized instead by “amnesty, integration, and 
demarcation.” During Adenauer’s chancellorship two amnesty laws were passed.220 
Within the context of his domestically broadly supported Vergangenheitspolitik and the 
so called Schlussstrichdebatte (closing line debate) the Bundestag passed another law that 
even reversed the consequences of the denazification process for those officials who as 
former members of the NSDAP had been removed from public offices.221  Subsequently, 
most of these people were reintegrated into public service and regained their prior status 
as civil servants. Concomitantly to amnesty and reintegration, a process of normative 
Abgrenzung (normative demarcation) was pursued, not only to satisfy the Allies. Within 
this process “any positive ideological acknowledgement of National Socialism and anti-
Semitism became taboo.” Proceedings were brought against “people who openly justified 
Nazi crimes, in particular, the murder of the Jews, or who seriously criticized the 
legitimacy of the anti-Hitler resistance movement.”222 
Although, initially, Vergangenheitspolitik was broadly supported in Germany, it 
became an issue of public criticism in the mid-1950s. Particularly in the late-1950s and 
early-1960s younger people increasingly raised questions about the individual 
involvement of the postwar political establishment in Nazi affairs, and the period of 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung began. Its major events were the opening of the 
Ludwigsburg center for the prosecution of Nazi crimes in 1958, the Eichmann trial in 
1961, the Spiegel Affair of 1962 and the Auschwitz trials of 1965. This period was 
characterized by fierce political debates in the 1960s and the 1970s, and a broad 
information campaign about Nazi crimes, such as the popular Holocaust TV series in the 
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early-1980s. Only within the period of Vergangenheitsbewältigung was a German 
majority eventually willing to reflect “critically about the period of National 
Socialism.”223 What the allies had started in the 1940s, needed far more time and an 
sincere endogenous effort by the Germans themselves. Denazification could not be 
simply imposed, but needed self purification as well as the progress of democratic 
consolidation over more than two decades time.  
Just as the late success of Vergangenheitsbewältigung would not have been 
possible without active involvement of the West Germans, the social transformation from 
an authoritarian state to a mature democracy depended on growing domestic support for 
the new Federal Republic of Germany. To foster support for democracy, the Allies 
promoted democratization from the top and from the bottom alike. During the occupation 
phase, the Allies used their strong position to influence the German learning process 
externally through a stick and carrot strategy, or through direct intervention. Basically, 
“the defeated [had] little choice but to comply. The suspension of sovereignty and the 
military occupation created political preconditions for the implementation of the Potsdam 
program that were well nigh inescapable.”224 Only some of those who had committed 
serious war crimes and were threatened by trials had fled the country, foremost to South 
America. Escape or emigration from the western occupation zones was no alternative for 
most of the Germans anyway. The majority put up with the situation.  
Incidents of resistance against the occupation forces were almost zero; 
tendentious rumors about the persistence of the Wehrwolf (defence wolf) 
notwithstanding. Overall, the western occupation powers were perceived as much better 
than the Soviet Union. Americans especially enjoyed a high reputation as a norm 
entrepreneur. They were regarded as the “friendly enemy,”225 the United States as a 
successful nation and because the memory of the U.S.-occupation in 1918-22 in the 
Rhineland was a positive one. This perception produced a favorable resonance towards 
western norms. This positive bias increased further with the strong U.S. commitment to 
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the people of Berlin during the First Berlin Crisis and the successful Berlin Airlift of 
1948-9. Consequently, in their search for a new identity, “West Germans transformed 
themselves in the direction of the successful democratic model offered by the Americans, 
whose economic potency and relaxed lifestyle seemed highly attractive.”226 
The political transformation took place in stages. First, German self-government 
was formally restored, political life organized according to democratic standards. The 
Allies, step by step, handed over political responsibility to the Germans. However, the 
Allies used their control capacity during that process, closely regulating and intervening 
in political activities as they saw fit as late as 1952. When political parties were again 
allowed in Germany, first on the local, then on the regional level,227 the Allies licensed 
only parties “with a democratic potential” in order to moderate the German party system 
and to ensure a democratic development. The Allies were especially on guard against 
rightist parties to prevent the return of Nazism.228 Practically until the end of Allied party 
licensing in November 1949, refugees from the former east German territories were 
treated as a potential spoiler group and prevented from forming political parties. Only 
after the first general elections in the newly founded Federal Republic of Germany could 
the Block der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten (Bloc of Expellees and Persons 
Deprived of Rights) emerge and represent their interests in politics.229 Yet, even though 
there was still a lobby group that grieved about the lost German territories in the East, 
radical nationalism was not dominant in German domestic politics after 1945.230 The 
Allies had even established the German Länder (states) boundaries in a way that seldom 
corresponded with the German Länder boundaries prior to the war in order to “discourage 
strong subnational loyalties that might interfere with commitment to the new national 
political system.”231 The modest bottom-up beginnings of German self-government and 
the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany took place under close Allied 
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supervision. Delegates of the Landtage (land legislatures) drafted the Grundgesetz (Basic 
Law), the West German pendant to a constitution. The name of the document was chosen 
to express its provisional character, since the delegates “did not want to accept the 
division of Germany into two political systems...and provided that it would be replaced 
by a newly drafted constitution as soon as Germany was reunited.”232 For the same 
rationale, Bonn was chosen as the government seat. 
The drafters of the Grundgesetz applied the lessons of Weimar and avoided the 
weaknesses of the Weimar Constitution. The first 19 articles, prominently prefixed, 
formulated the basic rights as the core of the new democratic German political system, 
centering around human rights, democracy,233 rule of law, and the separation of 
executive, legislative and judicial power.234 The Preamble of the German Basic Law also 
reflects the change in German policy from radical nationalism towards integration and the 
political aim “to serve world peace as an equal partner in a united Europe.“235 
The new electoral system had a reasonable threshold that prevented a 
counterproductive fragmentation of political parties. Splinter parties were not represented 
in parliament. These arrangements enabled stable governing coalitions (and this 
continuity, on the other hand, enabled the parties in governmental responsibility to solve 
the social and economic problems of the day and to gain trust from their 
constituencies).236 
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Furthermore, the rights of the Bundespräsident (German President) were 
significantly reduced compared to Weimar and the rights of the Bundeskanzler (German 
Chancellor) strengthened accordingly. The President of the Federal Republic of Germany 
has a more representative function than an active role in daily politics. The Chancellor is 
the central authority in the government, based on his Richtlinienkompetenz (directive 
authority). The Chancellor needs to be legitimized by a majority in parliament and he can 
only be forced to resign in the context of a konstruktives Mißtrauensvotum (constructive 
vote of no confidence), thus only when a majority in parliament agrees on a new 
Chancellor to prevent a political deadlock.237 
Amendments of the Grundgesetz require a two-thirds majority of both houses of 
Parliament, the Bundestag and the Bundesrat. Some provisions are not subject to change. 
These include the federal organization and the protection of basic civil liberties. Also, the 
Grundgesetz set up the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) that has 
the “power to annul acts of the legislature or the administration if they violate the 
Grundgesetz. The court is also authorized to forbid unconstitutional parties if such action 
is recommended by the Cabinet.”238 The Bundesverfassungsgericht banned the 
Sozialistische Reichspartei (Socialist Reich Party, SRP) as a neo-Nazi group in 1952, and 
the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (the German Communist Party, KPD) in 1956. 
239 
The ideological split of Europe during the Cold War, between the liberal, 
Christian and social democracies in the West and the Communist authoritarian states in 
the East, surely also had an effect on the empowerment of the democratic norms after the 
war in Germany. The threat of Communism strengthened the Western identity of the 
people in the Federal Republic of Germany, which was at the same time a democratic 
identity. The choice for democracy and the choice for the West coincided. After the 
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Second World War, most of Western Europe committed itself to democracy240 and 
embraced the institutions of market-capitalism.241 This choice was not automatic from the 
beginning. Communist parties remained influential for some time in Belgium, France, 
and Italy. Socialist ideals also remained in Germany (reflected in the Social Democratic 
programs up to Godesberg 1959 and in the Berlin wing of the Christian Democrats 
around Jacob Kaiser). In Germany there was a fierce debate about Adenauer’s 
Westpolitik (policy of Western integration), centering on the issue whether a complete 
commitment to the West would forsake a future unification of the two Germanys. The 
domestic struggle between the Christian Democrats (CDU) and the Social Democrats 
(SPD) was finally decided in favor of the former.242 For the first time in history Germany 
deliberately chose the West in contrast to the notorious “Rapallo policy” of swinging 
between East and West, what the French called “incertitudes allemande.”243 The military 
protection of NATO and “the solution of the problem of controlling the Ruhr through 
European integration strengthened the incipient ties to the West, while the Warsaw Pact 
and COMECON [Council for Mutual Economic Assistance] failed to achieve a 
comparable attraction for an orientation to the East.” In the process of German military 
integration, occupation forces became partner forces. Also, the strong U.S. troop presence 
in the Federal Republic of Germany had a stabilizing effect on democracy.244  
  Strong external support succeeded in stabilizing the nascent Republic 
domestically. In contrast to Versailles, the Western Allies, particularly the United States, 
realized that a democratic and peaceful Germany could only be reconstructed by 
economic and monetary aid. The financial aid of the European Recovery Program (ERP), 
better known as the Marshall Plan (1947), a key element of American policy to contain 
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Communism in West Germany and elsewhere, resulted in rapid economic development 
and stabilized the young democracy. Instead of leading to reparations, inflation, 
economic crisis and widespread unemployment, democracy was now seen as a norm that 
was capable of producing the so called Wirtschaftswunder (economic miracle) of 
Western Germany.245  In Germany “the government is viewed largely as an agency of 
administration, the attachment to the political system is closely related to the ability of 
the government to satisfy pragmatic needs.”246 The rising standard of living in West 
Germany encouraged an acceptance of the new political system. People got used to the 
new regime and recognized its achievements. Prosperity supported both the 
internalization of liberal democratic values and the development of an emotional bond to 
democracy. Due to the favorable economic development, a large middle class evolved 
that was “sympathetic to democratic ideas and institutions.”247 Gradually, German 
patterns of thought and behavior were converging with Western models of a democratic 
political culture.248 The early economical and political success of the young 
Bundesrepublik (Federal Republic) significantly facilitated norm empowerment. 
4. Outcome 
The political shock of total defeat of the Third Reich offered the chance for a 
“democratic new beginning.”249 This third attempt to democratize Germany succeeded, 
yet only for the Western part of the country and with the active support of the occupation 
powers that controlled and actively supported the democratization process over a 
relatively long period of time.250 
The institutional transformation, under the external pressure of an occupation 
regime, was the first step towards democracy. This was a necessary but insufficient 
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condition for norm empowerment. Initially, the imposed democracy was supported only 
by a minority. The more important step toward a stable democracy was the internalization 
of democracy that took place over a much longer time period, mainly after the Federal 
Republic of Germany had been founded. This process was “driven forward by critical 
Germans themselves.”251 External and internal forces combined to construct a Western 
based German democracy. 
The Allied suppression of radical attitudes and the empowerment of democratic 
norms were important factors in the democratization process.252 An appropriate 
constitution coupled with a favorable economic development also promoted a profound 
attitudinal change in German society. Yet, the growth of a stable democratic political 
culture took time. First, under Allied inducement and coercion, later voluntarily, German 
society gradually freed itself from its authoritarian political culture and replaced the 
traditional scheme with a model of Western democracy.253 
In this connection, one should note that, in contrast to the Weimar experience and 
to that of the former Yugoslavia, soldiers in the Federal Republic of Germany played a 
positive role in the democratic consolidation, aided by colleagues in parliament and 
elsewhere is society who, without exception, had been witnesses to the democratic civil 
military failures of the 1920s that led, in turn, to the perversion of the soldierly and 
political ethos in the Wehrmacht in National Socialism. The Federal Republic of 
Germany had no private armies linked to political parties. Political conflict did not unfold 
in the streets of towns and villages in the guise of ideological struggle. It is true that 
Germans who adhered to anti-bourgeois ideals and retained a totalitarian mindset had a 
complete German state and armed forces in which to serve, something quite at odds with 
Weimar, but also, a fact, in retrospect of merit for the democratic consolidation of the 
Bundesrepublik.  Such men were on the other side of the German Mittelgebirge (low 
mountain range) and not downtown in Cologne or Hamburg.  Without a new Groener-
Ebert deal, such figures as  Heusinger, Speidel, Kielmansegg, de Maiziere and Baudissin 
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were anything other than men such as Seeckt or later Blomberg, Keitel and Jodl. Each 
one had made his way in a demilitarized world of the half decade or more in which at 
least West Germany had no army whatsoever. Each man accepted the need to build the 
new army on a foundation offered by parliament of the German Grundgesetz, and each 
one saw the merit, if not the ease, with which West Germany could be integrated into the 
ranks of what had previously been the victorious powers and their armed forces.  
Although the Bundeswehr was not treated with the praise and propaganda of former 
times, its foundation and evolution posed no threat to democracy; on the contrary, with 
the ideal of Innere Führung it contributed greatly to the success of Staatlichkeit und 
Demokratie in Bonn. 
Democracy had been widely rejected as an “import from the West” during the 
Weimar period.254 In the Federal Republic of Germany, the democratic regime became 
very popular.255 Due to dedicated norm empowerment, the gap between the imposed 
political system and German political culture gradually closed. Overall, the identification 
of the people with their regime was just the opposite compared to the development after 
the First World War. After a few years, a more passive attitude towards the West German 
democracy was replaced by approval.256 An important criterion for the entrenchment of 
democratic attitudes, an “affective bond” to the new state, developed. Approval of 
democracy in West Germany not only followed from rationality, such as the 
Vernunftrepublikaner did in the Weimar Republic, but also from heart.257 
About a decade after the war, democracy was stabilized in West Germany. The 
Federal Republic of Germany gained a status of semi-sovereignty in 1955, direct external 
influence decreased and was replaced by a more indirect, but “still effective form of 
watchful commentary by international public opinion” and the reserved powers of the 
allies concerning German reunification and Berlin.258 The growing standard of living and 
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significant improvements in the overall well-being of the populace resulted in a favorable 
attitude towards the political regime. Not only did the acceptance of the democratic 
regime and democratic procedures increase, but trust in such a system grew also. Since 
the mid-1960s the interest of the citizens to participate more actively in politics grew.259 
Eventually, the “values of democracy, antimilitarism, and international cooperation” 
became deeply entrenched in German society.260 Democratic procedures have worked in 
Germany for a long period and “democratic assumptions, values, and patterns of behavior 
have become widely and deeply assimilated.”261 In a collective learning process a new 
German “post national identity” formed, a “culture of restraint” characterized by 
cooperation, multilateralism and pacifism.262 
The German case shows how political culture can change and be changed. The 
often cited sentence that “Bonn was not Weimar” describes that change most strikingly. 
However, democracy could only take hold in Germany because it was supported by the 
people and became normatively internalized. External support promoted this 
development, but “the Germans’ own contribution to the anchoring of democracy was 
certainly more decisive.”263 
Today, the Federal Republic of Germany is often regarded as a model for 
successful democratization in the aftermath of conflict. After the Zeitenwende in 1989/90 
and its reunification, Germany became an exporter of liberal democracy, first to the rest 
of the country, later to the Central and Eastern European countries. 
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1. Post-Conflict Situation 
The war in Bosnia ended officially with the signing of the General Framework 
Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Dayton Peace Accords) on November 
21, 1995, in Dayton, Ohio.265 
Three and a half years of ethno-political war from March 1992 until November 
1995 had turned Bosnia into a devastated country. Both the degree of physical destruction 
and social disorientation were high. The fighting and ethnic cleansing had claimed an 
estimated 200,000 lives.266 Of a total Bosnian pre-war population of nearly four and a half 
million, about one half was displaced. More than a million Bosnians fled the country; 
another million people were internally displaced.267 Thousands were homeless since most 
of Bosnia’s infrastructure was destroyed or severely damaged.268 The supply situation was 
catastrophic and the country was completely dependent on external support. 
The intangible war damages were also high, though very difficult to estimate from 
outside. Radical nationalism and the longstanding, acrimonious war among Bosniacs, 
Croats and Serbs269 had polarized a population into three deeply divided and separately 
administered parallel societies. The dense intermingling that was typical for Bosnia 
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before the war had given way to ethnic homogenization. Consequently, the international 
peace building mission faced unprecedented challenges in its efforts to reconstruct the 
multi-ethnic state. The highest priority tasks were humanitarian assistance; the disposal 
and/or repair of damaged infrastructure; the demobilization of the three separate 
militaries and various paramilitary forces, and the latter’s subsequent reintegration into 
society; the creation of new viable state institutions, particularly of the military, the 
police and the legal authorities; and a domestic reconciliation process of an 
unprecedented dimension in Europe. 
The terms of the Dayton Peace Accords and its eleven annexes were the starting 
point for the social reconstruction project. According to the peace agreement, the territory 
of Bosnia was divided almost equally between two Entities. Areas mostly populated by 
Bosniacs (Muslims) and Croats formed the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (51 
percent of Bosnia’s territory), areas with mostly Serb population formed the Republika 
Srpska (RS, 49 percent of Bosnia’s territory), both neatly divided by the Inter-Entity 
Boundary Line (IEBL). Regardless of the boundary demarcation between the Entities, 
Dayton stipulated that the free movement of civilians throughout Bosnia would be 
ensured, refugees could return to their homes, and that the former parties to the conflict 
would “cooperate in the investigation and prosecution of war crimes.”270 Annex 4 of the 
Dayton Peace Accords contained a draft constitution. The Bosnian Constitution in its 
Preamble explicitly stressed the commitment to respect human rights and to establish 
democracy. Central national institutions, such as a three-member presidency (one from 
each of the three major ethnic groups), and a bicameral parliament would be formed. 
Over and above that, the Entities would have separate institutions; actually, most power 
resided in the Entities, which were also allowed to entertain “special relations” with their 
respective home countries Serbia and Croatia.271 The Dayton Peace Accords dealt with 
many issues beyond a regular peace treaty.  For example, the first national elections were 
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scheduled as part of the terms of the settlement for September 1996. They were to be held 
under supervision of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE).272 
The main actors of the international community that took responsibility for the 
implementation of the Dayton Accords and supported the democratization process of 
Bosnia were the UN, the EU, NATO, the OSCE, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
and the World Bank.273 The instrument through which the international community would 
direct the civilian implementation of the Dayton Peace Accord was the Office of the High 
Representative (OHR), an inter-institutional body created specifically to coordinate and 
guide the different agencies. The military implementation of the peace settlement took 
place under the authority of NATO with its 60,000 troops strong Implementation Force 
(IFOR) as a peace enforcement operation under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.274  
The establishment of a democracy, of market economy and rule of law and, above 
all, the regeneration of multi-ethnicity was a daunting task since the most important 
prerequisites—internal peace and trust among the various ethnic groups—were 
completely lacking in the aftermath of the conflict.275 
2. Cultural Match 
The cultural match in the post-conflict phase can be regarded as negative (“-”). 
The people of Bosnia had had only a short experience with democracy in the Bosnian 
Republic after the breakdown of Communism at the end of the Cold War. However, to 
get a more complete picture of the political culture in Bosnia in the aftermath of the civil 
war, it is necessary to look at the broader Yugoslav context,276 since until its referendum 
on independence on February 29 and March 1, 1992, and its subsequent recognition as an 
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independent state by the European Community (EC) on April 6, 1992, Bosnia was one of 
the Republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.277 And a long era of 
belonging to Tito’s Socialist Yugoslavia had had a deep impact on the political culture in 
Bosnia.  
From the end of the Second World War until 1990, Yugoslavia was an 
authoritarian one-party state. Nevertheless, Yugoslavia was more liberal than most other 
Socialist countries. Communist-ruled Yugoslavia, as a non-aligned country, was 
internationally more open, more western oriented and more integrated into the world 
economy than any other Socialist country. Since 1955, Yugoslav citizens had been 
allowed to travel and to work abroad. As many as 690,000 of them had gone to Germany 
alone in the 1960s as Gastarbeiter (guest workers). Elements of Eastern and Western 
culture had melded into a unique composition of a multi-ethnic state, in which people 
held different loyalties and identities concomitantly.278 The ethnic composition of 
Yugoslavia was reflected in its decentralized political structure. The main “nations,” 
“defined by a common religion, language, and political consciousness”—Bosniacs, 
Croats, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Serbs, and Slovenes—enjoyed a large degree of 
autonomy within their respective Republics.279 
Following the experience of the First Yugoslavia (1918-1941), Yugoslavia’s 
Socialist regime was strongly committed to the idea of peaceful multi-ethnic coexistence 
and it prosecuted acts of nationalism as a threat to that ideal. The ideal of the 
multinational state was reflected in the guiding principle of brotherhood and unity.280 
Edvard Kardelj, Tito’s chief ideologue, created an official state identity based on an 
ideology that stressed the uniqueness of Yugoslavia’s political system in comparison to 
hostile others, such as to a liberal-democratic regime or to a statist regime. Kardelj did 
                                                 
277 The referendum on independence from Yugoslavia was boycotted by the majority of Bosnian 
Serbs. However, the results were in favor of independence; Lukic, 56; Malcolm, 231-233. 
278 Woodward, 1, 29. 
279 The republics “had administrative and budgetary autonomy over their economies, education, and 
culture.” Woodward, 31. 
280 That political commitment was also reflected in the constitution that prohibited “propagating or 
practicing national inequality and any incitement of national, racial, or religious hatred and intolerance.” 
Ibid., 37-39. 
 83
not stress the “common ethnic, political and cultural characteristics shared by 
[Yugoslavia’s] constituent nations.” On the contrary, according to Dejan Jovic, he 
neglected all the “instruments that would in other types of social projects help strengthen 
internal cohesion, such as ethnic similarities, state centralism or nationalism in both civic 
and ethnic sense.” Indeed, the ideological commitment to Marxism prompted the 
Yugoslav Communists “to underestimate the chance for a liberal democracy or 
nationalism to compete with socialism as a vision of the future society.” The Soviet 
model of Socialism was declared “as the only real threat.” Thus, the Yugoslav 
Communists became dependent on the continuation of the international order, especially 
of the Soviet Other. When the Soviet Union eventually eroded and then broke down, 
Yugoslavia lost “both pillars of [its ideological] identity: internal cohesion and an 
external difference.” According to Jovic, this identity crisis “and not ethnic hatred, 
nationalism or the economic crisis, was the main reason why [Yugoslavia] 
disintegrated.”281 But, surely, the latter also had a strong influence on the events that 
followed. 
For almost four decades “the mixture of constitutional principles and international 
ties that defined Yugoslavia had produced a relatively prosperous, open, and stable 
society.” Yet, in the volatile economic and political climate of the 1980s (oil shocks, a 
debt crisis and rapidly growing inflation) and after the death of Yugoslavia’s integrative 
political figure, Tito, in 1980 the failure of reforms threatened the internal balance and 
the Yugoslav compromise began to fall apart.282 
Economic equality among the Republics had played a crucial role in Socialist 
Yugoslavia. Equality and unity in harmony could only be reached via the redistribution of 
wealth. The funds for the underdeveloped parts of Yugoslavia were the principal 
instrument of financial transfer from North to South. Yet, over time, the functions and the 
power of the federal government declined in favor of the Republican governments, and 
dissent over economic balancing increased accordingly.283 This was fed by the rising 
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radical nationalism in Serbia, which started after the 1974 constitution, accelerated when 
Milosevic came to power in 1986 and finally triggered the Croat nationalism. In the 
1990s, a rapidly deteriorating economy, along with high rates of unemployment and 
hyperinflation resulted in the political polarization of republican and federal interests and 
led to political radicalization. Yugoslavia was at the brink of civil war.284 
Towards the end of this highly unstable period of rapid political change and the 
failed attempt to transform “a socialist society to a market economy and democracy,”285 
consensus could no longer be reached among the Yugoslav Republics and the League of 
Communists of Yugoslavia broke apart. The Socialist state had become increasingly 
dysfunctional under economic crisis and rising nationalism. Its legitimacy eroded. People 
were disenchanted with Socialism and identified increasingly with ethno-nationalist 
slogans.286 
In that strained political atmosphere the first multiparty elections were held in all 
Yugoslav Republics in 1990. The problems of the day and the resulting fears of the 
people created a fertile ground for nationalist extremists. In their election campaigns, 
politicians such as Franco Tudjman and Slobodan Milosevic exploited the economic 
problems, the growing economic inequality between the Republics, the declining 
standard of living, the high unemployment rates, and the hyperinflation in their rhetoric 
and preached ethnic division and hatred to an uncertain people.287 Democratic norms had 
“no meaning in circumstances of scapegoating and demagoguery by dictators who [took] 
advantage of crises to further their own ends.”288 The nationalist strategy worked. In the 
first free and democratic elections in Yugoslavia, voters mostly ignored multi-ethnic, 
pan-Yugoslav parties and generally voted along ethnic lines. According to Huntington, 
the elections showed that “people identify with family, faith, and blood, and unless the 
rules of electoral engagement are very carefully constructed, politicians competing for 
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office have little choice but to appeal for votes in these terms.”289 That had the worst 
implications on Bosnia, the Republic with the least homogeneous society. Regarding 
ethnicity, Bosnia looked like “an interwoven tapestry of overlapping minorities.”290 
Every third marriage in Bosnia was among individuals from different ethnicities.291 But 
still, the Socialist endeavor to create a common Yugoslav identity had had only limited 
success.292 Bosnia had never been an independent state in modern times. Bosnia had been 
part of the Ottoman or of the Habsburg Empire until it came under Communist rule in the 
former Yugoslavia. As a result, there existed no common Bosnian identity.293  
Thus, Bosnia was no exception to the general voting behavior in the Yugoslav 
Republics, and “the election results read more like a census of national identity in the 
socialist period.” The nationalist parties, the Party of Democratic Action (SDA, 
representing the Bosniacs), the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(HDZ, a branch of the ruling party in Croatia), and the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS, 
representing Serbs outside Serbia) won the election of 1990 with results almost identical 
to a census in 1981. The SDA gained 33.8 percent of the votes, the SDS 29.6 percent, and 
the HDZ 18.3 percent. Consequently, the first national assembly in Bosnia was 
dominated by three ethnically-based parties that formed a grand anti-Communist 
coalition.294 The power-sharing mechanisms that were established to accommodate the 
diverse interests soon broke down in fundamental disagreement about the principle 
direction this republic should take. Thus, instead of fostering democracy as in the other 
parts of Central Eastern Europe the same year, the first elections in Bosnia and in the 
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other Yugoslav republics “became the critical turning point in the process of political 
disintegration over a decade of economic crisis and constitutional conflict.”295 
The disintegration of Socialist Yugoslavia, which reached a first culmination 
point when Slovenia and Croatia were recognized by the European Union as sovereign 
states in early 1992, had implications on Bosnia’s domestic politics. Whereas the other 
seceding Yugoslav Republics had a more homogenous society with a dominating ethnic 
group, which made secession and identity formation easier, in Bosnia none of the three 
ethnicities was a majority which could dominate the others. The domestic disagreement 
over the future of the Bosnian Republic, over secession or unity with the “rump” 
Yugoslav federation (Serbia and Montenegro), with Bosnian Serbs in favor of unity, 
Bosniacs and Bosnian Croats in favor of secession, already reflected the upcoming period 
of struggle. The Badinter Commission’s invitation to all republics to hand in their quest 
for independence and the subsequent referendum in Bosnia to determine its stance were 
the major steps on the road to war.296 Boycotted by the Bosnian Serbs, a majority of 99 
per cent voted for independence, which was subsequently recognized by the EU and the 
United States, though with great hesitation. By that time, the war had moved from 
Slovenia to Croatia and was threatening to move into Bosnia now. The Bosnian Serbs, 
fearing to become a minority in a new state where they were a majority before, seized the 
initiative supported by the Yugoslav Peoples Army (JNA), which was de facto controlled 
by the Serb Republic.  
Thus, power sharing–the formula most characteristically recommended for this 
kind of ethnically divided society–failed after only a few months. A democratic culture 
could not evolve. Ethno-nationalism supplanted democracy, which had very few 
advocates in a country that had lived through decades of one-party rule. During the war, 
every ethnicity filled the resulting vacuum of central power and developed its own 
institutions and administrations in the municipalities or on the regional level. These war-
time institutions were loyal to one ethnicity and hardly democratic in character. Yes, 
there was a democratic seed that could have grown, but the realities of a disintegrating 
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Yugoslavia did not allow it to do so. And three years of war did much to destroy what 
remnants were there. Democracy building after 1995 had to begin from the ground up. 
3. Norm Empowerment 
Although the starting position for the democratization endeavor was not favorable 
since the most important prerequisite, trust among the different ethnic groups, was 
missing, there was at least a strong external commitment to make democracy work in the 
war-shattered country. The international community, represented by economically potent 
actors, was willing to empower democratic norms and to commit the required resources 
for the democratization project. However, after eleven years of external norm 
empowerment, democratic norms are still not as entrenched in Bosnian society as might 
have been expected, since the required support from within is not strong enough. 
Five factors play a major role: (1) the weaknesses of the Dayton Peace Accords; 
(2) the restrained approach of the international community to implement Dayton; (3) the 
prevalence of ethnic nationalism in politics; (4) a lagging reconciliation process among 
the former warring parties (in combination with a lack of trust); and (5) the damaged 
reputation of the norm entrepreneur. 
First, as concerns the Dayton Peace Accords, there are many opinions about the 
strengths and weaknesses of the Accords and especially about the Bosnian Constitution. 
In retrospect, the agreement seemed to be the best solution possible at the time of its 
creation, and also for the initial post-conflict phase. The Dayton Peace Accords were the 
result of compromise. The primary interests of the international community and the aim 
of the comprehensive contract were to stop the fighting and to prevent further violence in 
the region, not to tackle the root causes of the conflict, or to create the most favorable 
conditions for democracy.297 Democratization was regarded as the right strategy for 
sustaining peace, but compromises had to be made towards that goal during the 
negotiations at Dayton. What today is regarded as the major shortcoming of the Bosnian 
Constitution and an obstacle towards a normal democratic structure and procedures—the 
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division into the three ethnic groups, the power-sharing among them and the strong 
Entities at the detriment of the central government—was a requirement in 1995.  
Nevertheless, the goals of Dayton were ambitious. The draft Constitution was the 
“blueprint” for a unified democratic state of two multi-ethnic Entities.298 Dayton sought to 
establish a political system that was entirely framed in ethnic terms, a fact that later had 
negative implications for internal norm empowerment and on the postwar development of 
the state.299 Yet, at the time of the peace negotiations and in the first years of the post-
conflict phase, this institutional division was the precondition for acceptability of the 
agreement in the first place, especially for the Bosnian Serbs. Finally ending the war was 
the supreme international interest in Dayton. The ethnic principle dominating in the new 
institutional framework gave people a feeling of security in their respective ethnic 
groups.300 It could not be expected that the former warring parties would depart from the 
bargaining table, forget about the recent events, and subsequently focus common efforts 
on the recreation of Bosnian political unity in a democratic structure. Thus, in the short-
term perspective of 1995, it was more important to reduce threat perceptions and to keep 
the peace among the groups than to take a long-term perspective and to try to create 
viable national democratic structures. The international community was aware of that 
weakness. When the Accords were signed, the institutional division of the three 
ethnicities was regarded “as a bad but necessary measure to find an end to the bloodiest 
conflict in Europe since World War 2 and [as] a chance to start rebuilding the war-torn 
BiH.”301 
At the time of the signing, the international community accepted that weakness to 
achieve its primary goal, aware of the fact that the ethnic division in the constitutional 
structure would not encourage inclusive policies.302 A simple democratic majority 
decision-making process implied the danger that “one of the ethnic groups would have 
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been voted down on an issue considered to be of vital national interest to that specific 
group.” Thus, sufficient institutionalized power sharing and veto mechanisms were seen 
as the best insurance against Bosnia’s disintegration.303 And although the Bosnian 
Constitution de facto divided the country into the two Entities, it also established “a 
common roof of national political, judicial, and economic institutions that would permit 
the country’s three ethnic communities to coexist peacefully within a single state.” 304 
Second, as concerns implementation, many observers and activists are sober. As 
appropriate as the framework might have been as an armistice in 1995, eleven years after 
living with that compromise, significant progress to move beyond Dayton has not been 
made. To make “Bosnia a stable, viable state with a robust rule of law and enduring 
central institutions, capable of making its way towards membership in the EU” it still has 
a long way to go.305 From hindsight, the Dayton Framework was an acceptable starting 
position towards the endeavor “to transform Bosnia into a liberal democracy on the 
assumption that doing so would reduce the likelihood of renewed fighting.”306 Yet, in the 
first years of the post-conflict operation, the international community focused more on 
the latter than on the former.307 
The military implementation of Dayton went smoothly. The strong presence of 
well equipped and well trained NATO troops did not invite resistance. The security 
situation in Bosnia improved quickly and constantly and over time the foreign military 
presence could be reduced.308  
The civilian implementation of Dayton did not take such a favorable course. The 
primary instrument for the civilian implementation of the peace process as a whole, and 
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for the empowerment of democratic norms in Bosnia, was and is the OHR.309 The office 
holder, the HR,310 is selected by and responsible to the Peace Implementation Council 
(PIC) that had been created for the coordination of international efforts to support Bosnia. 
However, since there were many different actors with their own agendas involved in 
Bosnia’s physical and social reconstruction it proved difficult, in practice, to coordinate 
them.311 
Whereas the military component for the implementation of the Dayton Agreement 
was relatively strong, the civilian component, initially, was comparatively weak. That 
weakness proved to be a major disadvantage to ensuring the full implementation of 
Dayton, especially against spoilers. 
The ability of the international community to empower democratic norms 
depended heavily on the HR, and his achievements depended foremost on two factors: his 
formal authority and the personality of the office holder.312 Regarding authority, one can 
distinguish between the period prior to and after the establishment of the so called Bonn 
powers, the legitimization of the HR “to break through political stalemates, push difficult 
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reforms forward, and even to remove obstructionist leaders.”313 Before the establishment 
of the Bonn powers, the international community could only pursue a limited stick and 
carrot approach against potential spoilers of the peace and democratization process. Thus, 
the first HR, Carl Bildt, had a relatively weak position and relied foremost on the good 
will of Bosnian political elites to cooperate in Dayton’s implementation. The result was 
often non-compliance or only selective implementation.314 Due to the obvious obstruction 
by Bosnian politicians, there was a growing consensus within the international 
community that stronger measures were needed to impose “democracy on Bosnia through 
external means.”315  
The introduction of the Bonn powers in December 1997 was a crucial turning 
point for the role of the HR since it made him the highest authority in Bosnia and enabled 
him to intervene directly in political affairs.316 Until Schwarz-Schilling became HR, his 
predecessors used the Bonn Powers with increasing frequency317 “to institute significant 
reforms, including passing laws, amending constitutions, issuing executive decrees, 
appointing judges, freezing bank accounts, overturning judicial decisions and removing 
and banning elected politicians and others from holding office or position.”318 
Practical experience showed that progress could be made towards the goal of a 
unified state when the international community enforced its will to create common 
institutions. More recently, parallel institutional structures have been dismantled and 
several new central institutions imposed in Bosnia, such as a common defense ministry 
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and a central bank. Furthermore, other integrating elements, such as a common currency, 
common license plates and state symbols have been established.319  
In spite of these successes, the Bonn powers are controversial since their 
extensive application turned Bosnia de facto into an international protectorate with 
negative side effects for democratic responsibility. Imposition runs counter to ownership, 
a principle very much upheld by the international community in Bosnia as it is the 
prerequisite for the “internationals’ to leave. The Bonn powers might have improved 
efficiency, but they have also slowed down or even have prevented democratic processes. 
International transitional governance in the long run is counterproductive to democratic 
self-determination, since local initiatives are stifled.320 Surely, political solutions are 
reached faster if final decisions are imposed from above, but this quasi authoritarian rule 
de facto also relieved Bosnian politicians from their obligation to cooperate in democratic 
processes across ethnic borders and to take local ownership for their affairs.  
Thus, each of the HRs had to carefully balance ownership and imposition, and 
they strongly diverged on this point. Due to rising frustration, the temptation of 
imposition often won the day. However, the current office holder stated upon taking 
office that “extensive use of the Bonn powers would be counterproductive. It would 
maintain a damaging culture of dependency and prevent locals from forging an authentic 
and home-grown, post-war political consensus.”321 Consequently, Schwarz-Schilling 
made the decision not to use the Bonn powers to impose legislation and defined his role 
more as “an advisor than a ruler,” as a supporter of domestic democratic processes. He 
saw (and sees) the primary means of his function in dialogue with the responsible elites 
instead of imposition and pressure.322 Since the international presence is fading out, this 
policy is a crucial test for the young democracy in Bosnia. 
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However, others tried before and failed. Former attempts to activate local 
ownership in Bosnia in order to consolidate democracy have failed due to a stable pattern 
of persisting attitudes within the political elites and their constituencies. Spoilers to the 
peace and democratization process remained influential after the war. Additionally, many 
politicians had and have not given up their prewar goals and thereby kept nationalism 
alive among their constituencies. In the 2006 election campaigns, nationalist rhetoric was 
even used by politicians who are considered as more moderate.323 
Overall, compared to postwar Germany the international community hardly 
interfered in Bosnian politics to disable actual or potential spoilers. Although the media 
monopoly of Bosnian Serb hardliners was broken324 and a number of Bosnians were 
removed from public offices or excluded from political party leadership, nationalist 
parties were not generally banned from politics and no democratic reeducation program 
was initiated. Instead there was a lot of continuity in Bosnian politics. Consequently, the 
political culture in Bosnia is still dominated by nationalism and nationalist parties, and 
the latter are still scoring successes at the ballot box.325 
Third, as concerns ethno-nationalism, the early hopes soon collapsed. Elections 
were perceived as one of the primary instruments to implanting a democratic culture and 
overcome the ethnic division. The first national elections were held relatively early after 
the cessation of war activities in September 1996. Warnings that “elections held so soon 
after the cessation of hostilities would merely consolidate the power of extremist 
nationalists who had a vested interest in resisting the reconciliation of Bosnia’s ethnic 
communities” were overheard.326 And that was exactly what happened. Nationalists 
cemented their power through democratic processes,327 “the most belligerent and narrowly 
nationalistic political parties within each of the three communities…swept the elections 
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at both the national and the entity level.”328 Tito’s system that placed all economic, 
political and legal power in the hands of one ruling political party, thus “remains alive 
throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, relatively unchanged. Since 1992, little actual 
reform had occurred, and three one-party political systems remain in place.”329 In 
consequence, the new democratic institutions have been dominated by politicians who 
opposed cooperation with the other ethnicities.330 Legitimized through elections, the 
nationalists began to obstruct the implementation of Dayton and the reconciliation 
efforts.331 
The international community did not stand idly by but applied a stick and carrot 
approach to influence the domestic political situation. Although the international 
community had not banned nationalist parties, it exercised pressure to prevent their 
participation in the government after their success in the elections.332 However, even 
though more moderate leaders also gained influence with support of the international 
community, the ethnic element has remained strong and still divides Bosnian politics. 
Fourth, the ethnic element, so far, has also prevented significant progress towards 
reconciliation within Bosnian society. A major step towards reconciliation is dealing with 
the recent past, particularly with the atrocities that occurred during the war. Gow stresses 
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“the process of making the truth known was of psychological, as well as social and 
political value. This was central to any process of rehabilitation and reconciliation.”333 
Beginning in May 1993, the UN established the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague (pursuant to Security Council Resolution 
827). In the first years of its existence, only a few cases could be brought before the 
ICTY.334 To get hold of indicted war criminals and thereby improve the effectiveness of 
the ICTY, the international community applied the principle of political conditionality. 
Only full cooperation with the ICTY would allow Bosnia to make progress in its effort to 
integrate into the Euro-Atlantic institutions. Until 2004, the limited cooperation of the RS 
with the ICTY had contributed to the slowdown of Bosnian efforts to become a member 
of NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program and to take further steps towards EU 
membership (completion of the Stabilization and Association Agreement, SAA). Yet 
eventually, massive external pressure from the international community resulted in 
compliance. In December 2003, the RS government established “The Commission for 
Investigation of the Events in and around Srebrenica between 10th and 19th July.”335 The 
purpose of the working body was to uncover the war crimes committed in Srebrenica. 
The RS government declared this effort as a measure to build confidence and to establish 
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lasting peace in Bosnia.336 Former RS Prime Minister Mikerevic and RS President Cavic 
officially apologized on behalf of the RS government for Srebrenica.337 Furthermore, the 
RS government has constantly transferred indicted persons to the ICTY over the last 
three years.338 
General Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic have evaded punishment so far, and 
the international community announced that the ICTY would not close its doors before 
all remaining fugitives were brought to justice. Since 2005, minor cases of war crimes 
have been dealt with before the Bosnian War Crimes Chamber in Sarajevo.339 
The punishment of those responsible for war crimes is only one side of the coin. 
The other, more important side is that people move beyond the war atrocities, since the 
latter can also still be exploited in the rhetoric of extremist politicians to keep animosities 
between the ethnicities awake. Reconciliation between the different ethnicities is the 
prerequisite for progress in other areas. Two aspects seem to be equally important for 
reconciliation, the willingness of one side to admit atrocities and the willingness of the 
other side to accept apologies, so that both sides can form a new beginning. Living in a 
multi-ethnic Bosnian society requires overcoming the stereotypes that were strengthened 
during wartime and getting to know each other again as people of a different ethnic 
background with shared hopes and, if looked upon more rationally, with common goals. 
However, emotions still have a stronger influence on attitudes and behavior of the people 
than rational cost-benefit analysis. In light of the fact that consequences of war are still 
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visible throughout society and that the memory of wartime is still fresh, one can conclude 
that it will take considerable time to overcome the past. 
Sokolovic argues for the establishment of an educational protectorate in Bosnia 
to overcome nationalism and to foster bottom-up support for democracy, since bottom-up 
motivation to accept new democratic norms and broad and positive resonance to 
democracy throughout society is key to achieving long-term success.340 
Yet this motivation is also influenced by the reputation of the norm entrepreneur, 
the last factor considered here. The reputation of the West suffered severely in the eyes of 
the Bosnian population during wartime, especially the image of the Europeans; first, due 
to the unwillingness of the West to stop the Bosnian war in an earlier phase, and later, 
due to the way the West dealt with that war. Initially, Western measures were focused on 
keeping Yugoslavia together at almost all costs. Then, conflict containment, i.e. 
avoidance of horizontal and vertical escalation, became the primary goals, along with 
humanitarian relief. Apart from the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, 
which led nowhere, there was no concerted international effort to end the war until 1995. 
Sanctions, UN peacekeeping, humanitarian operations, the no-flight zone and safe havens 
were all designed to limit, not to end the war. The UN mission, UNPROFOR, was 
perceived as weak and incapable. The military personnel were hardly able to defend 
themselves, as was demonstrated when UN personnel were taken hostage in 1994, nor of 
keeping the warring parties apart or avoiding the massacre at Srebrenica.341In the final 
analysis, the international community accepted the suffering in Bosnia, especially of the 
weakest part, the Bosniacs, who were most hampered by the arms embargo.342 Thus, 
frustration arose among the Bosniacs and a mood of “free riding” based on the perception 
of a weak West among Croats and Serbs. The failure to capture Karadzic and Mladic later 
added to that. 
                                                 
340 Sokolovic, 104. 
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Disagreements over the right strategy to contain the war delayed a unified and 
robust Western action to end the conflict. Only through the NATO air campaign 
(Operation Deliberate Force) were the warring parties finally brought to the bargaining 
table in the fall of 1995. The Air Campaign and the strong troop presence of IFOR in the 
post-conflict phase had a quick pacifying effect and generated respect especially for 
NATO and the U.S. After the war, the economic power of the West was attractive, since 
Bosnia depended on external aid. Financial incentives could buy cooperation and some 
politicians offered cooperation only in exchange for financial support ”or threaten[ed] to 
maintain open obstruction of Dayton’s implementation” should that aid be withheld.343 
However, emotions are stronger than utility analyses, and political conditionality 
has only a limited influence on the decisions taken in Bosnia. Obviously, people do not 
sell their vote to Western-backed parties to achieve a better life and financial support 
from the West.344 
The international context also initially had a negative effect on reconciliation and 
democratization efforts in Bosnia. The governments of Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo 
Tudjman, in Serbia and Croatia respectively, acted as external spoilers who closely 
coordinated their policies with the respective counterparts in Bosnia. This further 
strengthened the obstructing groups in Bosnia. Only after Milosevic and Tudjman left 
office and democratic successors followed, did Croatia and (partly) Serbia join the 
international community in its efforts to stabilize Bosnia.345 
4. Outcome 
After enduring war and ethnic cleansing, people were tired of war and ripe for 
change. But the various ethnic groups so far have not been ready to show forgiveness or 
to reconcile. Three and a half years of intra-state conflict put the different ethnicities far 
apart. Thus, democratization of this society with strong internal tensions and post-conflict 
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burdens proved to be more difficult than expected.346 Even under the constant engagement 
of the international community, Bosnia has only made slow though steady progress 
within the last eleven years. Presently a stable peace is missing, and the social 
reconstruction project lags behind. 
In spite of the slow progress, much has been achieved, especially as concerns 
institution building and reconstruction. The infrastructure has been rebuilt, existing 
institutions have been overhauled, and new democratic institutions have been created. 
The country has changed. When the post-conflict operation started in 1995, Bosnia was 
devastated; it had three separate armies, three separate police forces, and a weak national 
government that existed mostly on paper.347 Today, many democratic institutions are in 
place and working. The Presidency has advanced defense reform.348 Bosnia created a 
State Ministry of Defense in January 2006, and the Entity MODs were dissolved. 
However, ethnically mixed units have not been created yet. Furthermore, Bosnia has met 
the North Atlantic Council (NAC) criteria for Partnership for Peace although its 
membership was delayed due to the failure to capture and to arrest indicted war 
criminals.349 
Also, overall, the judiciary in Bosnia is judged as independent. “A Code of 
Ethics” containing “guidance to judges and prosecutors for exercising their authority in a 
fair, transparent and independent manner” has been introduced.350 However, obstacles to 
an efficient judiciary prevail in the institutional structure with “four parallel and separate 
jurisdictions, incoherent systems of law, directives coming from fourteen Ministers of 
Justice.”351 Still, according to the European Commission, “the judicial system is not 
completely free from political interference.”352 
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Regarding human rights and the protection of minorities, Bosnia has ratified all 
major UN and international human rights conventions, as well as the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Yet, actual 
implementation of these instruments still needs to improve.353 
The presidential and parliamentary elections at State, Entity, cantonal, and Brcko 
district level on October 1, 2006, were the first elections since Dayton which were “fully 
administered by the authorities of BiH...and [also] conducted generally in line with 
international standards.”354 However, the elections again underlined the ethnic cleavages 
that persist throughout Bosnian society.355 Nationalist rhetoric both from Serbs and from 
Bosniacs dominated the pre-election period and had an adverse effect on overall reform 
implementation.356 Police reform stalled. The constitutional reform intended to transfer 
competencies from the Entities to the state also failed.357 In that sense, Bosnia still suffers 
under the legacy of the Dayton Peace Accords and under the inadequacy of the Bosnian 
Constitution. Even though the Entities have been weakened and central institutions have 
been established, the central government is not strong vis-a-vis the Entities.358 Complex 
political structures prevent timely decision-making and reform. Further efforts to enhance 
central competencies at the state-level and to create “a more democratic and efficient 
state” have failed so far.359 
However unsatisfactory the velocity of progress might be, it is unlikely that 
democracy will fail in Bosnia in the long run. Peaceful means of dealing with conflict 
have become widely accepted, and Bosnia has reached the status of a nascent democracy. 
The main obstacle for the full implementation of the Dayton Accords and for significant 
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steps towards a more consolidated democracy is the prevalent, strong ethnic nationalism 
throughout the country.360 Thus, real progress depends on the willingness to overcome 
nationalist thinking and to develop a shared national identity. When the people of Bosnia 
adopt the multiple identities they had in the past, then the different ethnicities can coexist 
in a viable democratic state. The optimum would be for people to regard themselves first 
and foremost as Bosnians, and only secondarily as Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs. However, 
it would be sufficient if at least tolerance for other ethnic groups and respect for 
democratic institutions would spread as a means of peaceful conflict resolution. This is in 
the Bosnians’ common interest. Bosnia has “made marked progress toward closer 
integration into Euro-Atlantic structures.”361 Yet, it can join the European community 
only when it has overcome its internal division. Prospects of EU membership and 
external incentives have not been sufficient to overcome the domestic division along 
ethnic lines.362 Although the international community has tried to empower democratic 
norms and also significantly supported the democratization process in Bosnia, the result 
so far is only a partial success. Nationalism needs to be overcome to move Bosnia further 
towards a consolidated democracy. This requires that all ethnic groups “vest their 
interests in the multinational project” and cooperate voluntarily.363 Working together can 
improve relations among ethnic groups and finally enable them to overcome nationalism 
and to lessen the influence of extremists of all colors. Socioeconomic progress is crucial 
for that, as well as a viable and common European perspective. The international 
community can promote the normative reorientation process, but success eventually 
depends on the people of Bosnia and domestic support for democracy.  
In 2007, Bosnia is still ethnically divided. The peace in Bosnia is fragile and 
foreign troop presence is still necessary to keep the multi-ethnic state together. 
Fortunately, the international community is willing to continue its support in order to 
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stabilize the nascent democracy externally and to maintain patience until domestic groups 
have formed in sufficient numbers to support democracy from within.364 
D. CASE COMPARISON 
The three case studies show common patterns as well as diversities. All three 
countries, in the post-conflict phase, were perceived as posing a threat to European 
security due to the radical nationalism that led to war and prevailed in the respective 
society in the aftermath of the conflict. 
Diversities among the cases include (1) the quality of the cultural mismatch; (2) 
the degree of dependency on external support); (3) the quality of norm empowerment; (4) 
the reputation of the norm entrepreneur; (5) the composition of the society (homogenous 
vs. nonhomogeneous) and the quality of the reconciliation process; and (6) the outcome 
of the democratization endeavor (rejection, or acceptance and internalization of 
democratic norms). 
First, in all three postwar societies, there was a negative cultural match, but the 
quality of the mismatch differed. In Germany after 1945 the cultural mismatch was the 
largest as compared to the cultural mismatch of 1918 (rather negative) or to the cultural 
match in Bosnia (the least negative among the three cases). 
The political culture in Germany after 1945 was characterized mainly by 
militarism, nationalism and statism. Democracy did not have a good reputation after the 
disappointing experience with the Weimar Republic. Yet, the total defeat of the Third 
Reich had also discredited the former belief system and generated an opening for the 
democratic alternative. There also existed a vacuum in leadership, since the political 
leadership of the Third Reich was either dead, imprisoned or had left the country. 
Furthermore, people in Germany expected that democracy would again be imposed after 
the total defeat of the Third Reich and were mentally prepared for a regime change. 
The political culture in interwar Germany was characterized mainly by 
authoritarianism, militarism and revisionism. The attitude towards democracy was 
ambivalent, and support for the imposed regime was widely missing. Democratic norms 
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were rejected domestically, both by elite groups and by an increasing majority of the 
people. The lack of experience with democratic processes and an undeveloped 
democratic culture where the need to compromise was not accepted made it difficult to 
transform the existing political culture. Even the representatives of moderate political 
parties did not rely on democratic procedures—in solving political conflicts by peaceful 
means. Confrontation dominated cooperation and even led to acts of politically motivated 
violence. 
The political culture of Bosnia is comparable to that of Weimar in certain aspects, 
especially the latter. People in Bosnia had almost no experience with a multiparty 
parliamentary democracy. They were able to gain only a small measure of experience 
with democratic procedures during the short period between the end of the Cold War and 
the violent break-up of Yugoslavia. During the transformation to a post-communist 
society, the domestic situation was volatile, characterized by widespread fear and 
uncertainty. People gathered around their own kind, and ethno-nationalism polarized and 
divided Bosnian society and politics along ethnic lines. 
The three societies also differed in their openness to regime change. German 
society after 1945 had been more open to change than after 1918. After 1918, trust in the 
authoritarian system was alive and well; whereas the totalitarian system was discredited 
completely after 1945. The people in Bosnia were also open to democracy because of 
their disappointing experience with Socialism, since the Socialist state had lost legitimacy 
due to its inability to cope with the economic crisis of the late 1980s. 
Second, the war produced different opportunities for the international community 
to use leverage in order to promote norm change. Germany after the First World War can 
be regarded as a deviating case, since the country did not have to suffer the otherwise 
typical consequences of physical war damage and destruction within the country. The 
situation in Germany after 1945 was just the opposite and similar to that of Bosnia after 
the war, creating a high degree of dependency on external support and thereby leverage 
for the international community. Both Germany after 1945 and Bosnia were completely 
dependent on external support to overcome a humanitarian catastrophe. In both countries 
the international community established a transitional administration and exercised direct 
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governmental control. The Allies were almost in complete and direct control over West 
Germany during the transitional administration in the zones, and Bosnia can still be 
regarded as an international protectorate. 
Third, norm empowerment also differed among the cases. In interwar Germany, 
international actors were not interested, and after the Great Depression, also not capable 
of influencing democratic development in Germany. Norms were empowered neither 
externally nor internally. State institutions were not democratized, and no measures were 
taken against potential or actual spoilers. Spoilers remained in influential positions in 
public offices and could fully unfold their potential when the economic situation 
deteriorated. Anti-democratic propaganda lessened the support for the new regime even 
further. Political fragmentation led to inconsistency in politics and apparently 
demonstrated the inability of the unsupported democratic government to cope with the 
problems of the day in a volatile period. 
In Germany after 1945, the Allies promoted democratization much more 
forcefully top-down and bottom-up alike. Potential spoilers were effectively prevented 
from entering politics and the media were democratized. The democratization process 
was further supported by a broad reorientation program and an active process of coming 
to terms with the past that also laid the foundation for reconciliation with the former 
enemies and for the integration in Euro-Atlantic structures. The political transformation 
took place in stages. First, German self-government was formally restored, and political 
life organized according to democratic standards. The Allies, step by step, handed over 
political responsibility to the Germans. However, the Allies used their control capacity 
during that process, intervening in political activities as they saw fit as late as 1952. The 
new electoral system successfully prevented a counterproductive fragmentation of 
political parties and enabled stable governing coalitions. Political continuity enabled the 
parties in governmental responsibility to solve the social and economic problems of the 
day and to gain the trust of their constituencies. Strong external support succeeded in 
stabilizing the nascent Republic domestically. Prosperity supported both the 
internalization of liberal democratic values, and the development of an emotional bond to 
democracy.  
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Although the willingness and the commitment of international actors to empower 
democratic norms in Bosnia were strong, the international community did not have a 
common strategy (comparable to the Potsdam program) to implement democracy and the 
overall approach was more restrained than in Germany after 1945. Particularly in the 
period before the establishment of the Bonn powers, the position of the HR was too weak 
to intervene adequately in politics in order to contain spoilers and to promote democratic 
processes. After the Bonn powers were formulated, a relatively small number of Bosnians 
were removed from public office or excluded from political party leadership, nationalist 
parties were not generally banned from politics, and no democratic reeducation program 
was initiated. Compared to the Denazification program, the removal of some prominent 
spoilers from politics was not enough to promote an attitudinal change among the 
Bosnian population.  
Also, the constitutional framework of the Dayton Peace Accords was and is an 
obstacle towards normal democratic structures and procedures on the national level. 
Instead of creating a united and democratic Bosnian state, de facto two democratic 
“Entity” subunits were created. However, the HR imposed several new central 
institutions in Bosnia by the application of the Bonn powers.  
Fourth, in the cases where the reputation of the norm entrepreneur was better, 
people adopted democratic norms more willingly, as demonstrated in the case of 
Germany after 1945 and also partially in Bosnia. The poor reputation of the external 
norm entrepreneur in Weimar on the other hand, contributed to the rejection of the 
imposed democracy. 
Fifth, reconciliation is, in theory, possible both internationally and domestically; 
however, in practice it is more difficult to deal with after intra-state conflicts than after 
inter-state conflicts. Strong measures against spoilers have to be taken and hate speech 
prevented in order to internalize a new mindset and to overcome ethnic stereotypes. Since 
political identities are socially constructed and subject to change, people can develop 




play the card of nationalism and polarize society. A more homogenous society in the 
cases of Germany, and the still ethnically divided and polarized society in Bosnia, 
supports that argument.  
All three cases show that the international context also matters. It can have either 
a weakening or a strengthening effect on democratization. In interwar Germany, the 
international environment was not supportive of democracy, since in interwar Europe, 
one country after the other fell back into authoritarian rule. In Bosnia, at least as long as 
Milosevic and Tudjman were in power in Serbia and in Croatia respectively, these states 
had a weakening influence on internal reconciliation and thereby on the democratization 
of the country. After Serbia and Croatia became democracies, the international 
environment became more supportive and more stabilizing for the nascent democracy of 
Bosnia. The international environment for West Germany, after 1945, was the most 
supportive for democracy among the three cases.  
The Cold War accelerated the political independence of the Western occupation 
zones and the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany, along with its subsequent 
integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. 
Sixth, the three cases differ in the respective outcomes of the democratization 
attempts. The case of Germany after 1945 is a prime example for a successful 
democratization in the aftermath of conflict, the case of Weimar is a prime example of 
failure, and the ongoing case of Bosnia so far, is one of partial success. 
The results of the democratization process are surprising, since the country with 
the greatest mismatch, Germany after the Second World War, achieved the best result 
and developed into a mature democracy, whereas the democratization of interwar 
Germany with less of a mismatch ended in failure, and Bosnia with the least mismatch 
still is in the state of a nascent democracy. This indicates that political culture can change 
and that norm empowerment apparently matters more than cultural match. 
The case of the Federal Republic of Germany shows that political culture can 
change in a society over a period of several decades given favorable conditions. West 
Germany transformed into a consolidated democracy from the apparently worst starting 
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position regarding the cultural match. A high degree of dependency on external aid after 
the war, the willingness and the commitment of the Western Allies to empower the 
transition process, and the almost complete control over political affairs in West 
Germany during the occupation phase, created favorable conditions for some already 
existing small, but under norm empowerment quickly growing islands of democracy 
within the country. Democratic development was promoted both by strong external, and 
by increasingly strong internal norm empowerment. The absence, prevention and/or 
control of potential spoilers of the process were as important as an appropriate 
constitution; the democratization of state institutions; the financial aid of the Marshall-
Plan (the foundation for the Wirtschaftswunder); the international reconciliation process; 
and the gradual integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. A quickly improving standard 
of living, in combination with political stability, demonstrated the achievements of a 
democratic regime, and trust developed towards democracy. The result was the 
internalization of democratic norms and a consolidated democracy. Again, the case 
demonstrates that norm empowerment is apparently more important than the quality of 
the existing cultural match at the beginning of the democratization process. 
The case of Weimar Germany confirms this conclusion. It had not been possible 
to change the political culture in Weimar Germany and to replicate the Western model 
without norm empowerment, even though the cultural match was not as negative as in the 
same society two and a half decades later. There were some weak islands of democracy, 
but they could not grow. Only a formal adoption of democracy took place. Even under 
the new democratic regime and (too many) democratic elections, the belief that an 
authoritarian alternative would be better remained unchanged throughout society.  
Spoilers to the democratization process were not contained. Although the 
Emperor had abdicated, de facto the same political figures that had been influential in the 
Wilhelmine Empire remained influential in the Weimar Republic and obstructed the 
nascent democracy. The reputation of the norm entrepreneur was very low from the 
beginning. The humiliating peace settlement and the subsequent actions of the West 
(especially concerning reparations) were counterproductive and had a weakening effect 
on democratization, since all the legacies of the lost war were linked to the imposed 
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political system. Strong domestic anti-democratic strands, even among politicians of the 
moderate parties in combination with a practically non-existent external and internal 
empowerment of democratic norms, the exploitation of constitutional weaknesses, the 
omission to democratize state institutions, political instability in an overall volatile 
political climate, and particularly the inability of the democratic government to cope with 
economic crisis, promoted the rejection of democratic norms, eventually resulting in the 
biggest democratization failure, so far. The failure of the Weimar democracy 
demonstrates how important it is that people accept democracy and develop trust into 
their institutions. People have to accept democratic procedures, political compromise and 
decisions. The more support democracy receives from its citizens, the more stable it is. 
Only when people have that trust can democracy survive political shocks or enduring 
crisis. If people are convinced that democracy cannot cope with political, social and 
economic tasks, the situation becomes problematic. Problems of efficiency lead to a loss 
of legitimacy for a democratic government.  
The case of Bosnia cannot be compared exactly with the other two cases because 
of its divided society as a consequence of interstate conflict. The case shows that an 
ethnic or identity-based division of the target society can pose an almost insurmountable 
obstacle to real progress in a democratization endeavor. However, democracy could 
achieve partial success, and it is unlikely that democracy will fail in Bosnia in the long 
run, but only as long as the international community is willing and capable of putting 
resources in the project to stabilize the nascent democracy. However, real progress in 
Bosnia depends on the development of much more tolerance among the ethnicities.365 
Last, but not least, the cases demonstrate that political change does not take place 
overnight, but that the transition from a nascent to a consolidated democracy can take 
generations. Even in the successful case, Germany after 1945, democratic institution 
building, under the external pressure of an occupation regime, was only a first step 
towards democracy. Initially, the imposed democracy was supported only by a minority. 
The more important step towards stable democracy, the internalization of democratic 
norms took place over a much longer time period, mainly after the Federal Republic of 
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Germany was founded. The growth of a stable democratic political culture took time. 
And this time horizon runs counter to the much more short-sighted post-conflict peace 
building horizons of the international community in their constant debates about exit 
strategies. 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis has analyzed how international actors intentionally diffuse norms in 
post-conflict peace building. The research has shown that even though the many peace 
builders are not unitary actors, they come predominantly from Western elites and share 
similar normative beliefs that they try to implant in war-torn societies. Norms of 
democratic governance are equated with good governance and the aim is to democratize 
respective countries. The case studies have shown how crucial the norm diffusion process 
is for the outcome of such an endeavor.  
Norm diffusion theory does not offer a formula for successful democratization, 
but it has explanatory power in studying success and failure of past and present 
democratization attempts. The concept can be a tool to analyze target societies, 
particularly the amount of cultural match and the required norm empowerment, and 
thereby protect against faulty assumptions and overoptimistic expectations in ongoing 
and future democratization projects. The cases indicate that it would be unwise to ignore 
the effects of the two variables, cultural match and norm empowerment, on 
democratization attempts in post-conflict situations. Several lessons can be drawn. 
First, although each post-conflict situation is unique, most share common 
characteristics, such as a large degree of physical destruction, a limited supply situation, 
the partial or complete breakdown of state institutions, and value disorientation in the 
war-torn society. These typical war consequences produce dependencies on external 
support. These dependencies give the international community leverage, particularly in 
the immediate post-conflict phase, and principles of conditionality can be applied since 
the target society has to accept conditions in exchange for support. Thus, the international 
community can use its leverage to promote norm diffusion and to empower democratic 
norms. Yet, over time that leverage diminishes since the primary needs of the target 




country proceeds. Thus, political conditionality and issue-linkage are more effective in 
the close aftermath of a conflict when the international community enjoys the greatest 
bargaining leverage.  
Second, after the partial or complete breakdown of state institutions, target 
societies are often internationally administered, at least temporarily. This form of direct 
governmental control through international agencies takes place only in post-conflict 
situations. It can lead to quasi-protectorates of long duration as in Bosnia after Dayton 
and in Germany after the Second World War, and offers a unique opportunity to 
introduce and to implant new norms. 
Third, the existing belief system in a target society can be an obstacle to the 
populations’ mental transformation in support of democracy. An analysis of the existing 
political culture in the target society helps to determine the cultural match and to identify 
potential spoilers to the democratization process. People are especially open to change 
and new ideas when they have lost trust in their prior leadership and political system. 
When authoritarian belief systems are more salient, democratic norms resonate less. The 
manner in which norm change is promoted is important, since in the context of an 
international presence and/or administration different mindsets and cultures clash. The 
cases indicate that a cultural match, however negative it might be, is not an 
insurmountable obstacle to democratization. Mindsets and political culture can change if 
presented accordingly. Where the conditions for the diffusion of democratic norms are 
not favorable, a strong empowerment of these norms by external and internal factors is 
important to help them gain ground. A lack of experience with democratic processes, an 
undeveloped democratic culture where the need to compromise is not accepted, makes it 
more difficult to transform the existing political culture but it is not impossible. 
Consequently, norm empowerment is more important in a democratization process than 
the amount of cultural match. 
Fourth, the democratization of existing or the establishment of new democratic 
institutions is a first necessary, though not sufficient, step towards democracy. New 
political structures are institutionalized in the constitution or the legislation of the target 
society. This is just the beginning of the internalization process, which needs to continue 
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long thereafter (as visible in all three cases). Institution building succeeds more quickly 
than changing the attitudes and preferences of the people behind these formal structures. 
But, the latter is the more important step for democratic institutions to develop into more 
maturity. Successful democratization depends on the acceptance and internalization of 
democratic norms by the target society. This acceptance, on the other hand, depends on 
both rational and emotional factors. Both need to be addressed by the creation of 
favorable conditions for a successful transition to democracy. Potential spoilers to the 
democratization process, in particular, need to be identified early, their “breathing space” 
and influence reduced accordingly.  
Fifth, external norm empowerment is most effective when it empowers domestic 
actors and strengthens already existing islands of democracy, however small they might 
be. The steps from a nascent democracy towards a more consolidated self-sustaining 
democracy depend on domestic support for the new regime. Thus, an initial strategy to 
develop domestic support is to strengthen democratic islands in order to help them 
survive and expand. Democratic consolidation depends on shared democratic norms and 
values within the target society and on the development of civic society to develop a 
democratic culture. And although transition processes are unstable and conflict-
producing, and democratization has destabilizing side effects, local stakeholders need to 
be gradually put at the center of the process. Gradually, self-government (ownership) 
needs to be restored; people have to take responsibility for their own affairs.  
Sixth, the more support democracy experiences from its citizens, the more stable 
it is. Only when people have that trust, can democracy survive political shocks or 
enduring crises. If people are convinced that democracy cannot cope with political, social 
and economic tasks, the situation becomes untenable. Problems of efficiency lead to a 
loss of legitimacy for a democratic government. The perceived effectiveness of a 
democratic regime, whether it is able to cope with the problems of the day, and whether 
the past was better than the present, plays a role. Democratic norms gain ground when 




growing prosperity and a decent standard of living enhance the legitimacy of a 
democratic regime. Economic efficiency leads to democratic viability. 
Seventh, the international context matters. A supportive environment promotes 
regime change; an obstructive environment can strengthen domestic spoiler groups, and 
thereby, at least slow down the democratization process. 
Eighth, when democratic institutions are formally in place, it is important that 
people in the target society act according to democratic principles and that they follow 
democratic procedures. Yet, a prerequisite often is that people in the target society first 
learn the new rules. This process must be allowed sufficient time. Reorientation programs 
can be supportive in order to build that understanding.  
Ninth, a peace settlement perceived as unjust or a policy of revenge is an 
inappropriate starting position for democracy. It is necessary to look ahead and to 
develop a motivating context that leaves room for reconciliation between the former 
opponents and for their reintegration into the international community.  
Tenth, a specific challenge is posed by the democratization of a divided society. 
Divided societies often cannot cope with the competition that democracy encourages, 
until structures to resolve internal disputes peacefully are in place.366 Ethnic division can 
be a strong intervening variable that cannot be overcome by external incentives alone, 
since the affective dimension is more important than the cognitive dimension. 
Furthermore, war atrocities and ethnic cleansing make reconciliation processes and the 
restoration of social peace within a divided society much more difficult. Yet, 
reconciliation is a prerequisite for social reconstruction.  
Last but not least, democracy takes root slowly. The transformation of a nascent 
democracy to a consolidated democracy does not take place in years, but in decades, or 
even generations. A long-term commitment of the international community is required. 
As Dobbins puts it: “while staying long does not guarantee success, leaving early ensures 
failure” in externally imposed democratization processes.367 The democratization of a 
                                                 
366 Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil War, ix, 235. 
367 Dobbins et al., xxiv. 
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divided society demands an even greater staying power of the international community 
than after an inter-state war. The international community needs to be prepared to invest 
both the sufficient time and the resources into the project. Patience is crucial in every 
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